Pavel Podvig
Pavel Podvig

@russianforces

11 Tweets 25 reads Mar 11, 2022
It appears that "escalate to de-escalate" is no longer a purely academic issue. So, is it a real thing? A thread. TLDR: Yes, it appears that it might be an option in some circumstances. And it depends on how serious Russia is about its own declaratory policy. 1/
First, Russia's current (2014) military doctrine says that nuclear weapons could be used in response to "an aggression against [Russia] with conventional weapons that would put in danger the very existence of the state." See russianforces.org 2/
So, how does "escalate to de-escalate" fit in? Does it? Technically, one can imagine a situation when Russia finds itself under a conventional attack and this attack gets to the point of threatening the very existence of the state. 3/
If this is the case, the doctrine says that Russia can use nuclear weapons in response. The response might (but doesn't have to) include a limited strike of some kind. The purpose would not be a certain military objective, like hitting an airfield or a ship. 4/
Rather, the idea would be to demonstrate that Russia believes that the threat is indeed existential and that it is prepared to respond by using its nuclear forces on a larger scale. One can see that a strike like that could have a de-escalatory effect in some circumstances. 5/
There is a different view of "escalate to de-escalate," which is often used to describe it in the West. The scenario is that Russia starts an aggressive action and then meets resistance and/or fails to achieve its objectives by conventional means. 6/
In this case, we are told, Russia would launch a limited nuclear strike to demonstrate to its opponents that they should accept defeat or face a larger-scale use of nuclear weapons. 7/
Note that this scenario would not involve an attack on Russia and a threat to its very existence. So, technically, this option is not compatible with Russia's military doctrine. If that matters, of course. 8/
One can also imagine a scenario in which the existential threat is a result of an aggression initiated by Russia. This threat may or may not involve an attack on Russia proper, so in this case it is not clear if a use of nuclear weapons would be compatible with the doctrine. 9/
The doctrine, of course, says that the attack must be "an aggression against [Russia]." Again, this assumes that the doctrine matters. Also, one should keep in mind that "aggression," "danger," and "the very existence" can be interpreted in many different ways. 10/
I guess the bottom line is that some kind of de-escalatory strike cannot be ruled out, but if one assumes that Russia takes its declaratory policy seriously there is a rather specific set of circumstances in which the military doctrine allows that. The question is, does it? 11/11

Loading suggestions...