So finally we have time to post that small thingie about the current cope about Russians fighting outside their defensive lines.
There are 3 lies in this claim.
The first lie is based on fairly known mantra: if the enemy is failing, you let him do instead of announcing it. 1/N
There are 3 lies in this claim.
The first lie is based on fairly known mantra: if the enemy is failing, you let him do instead of announcing it. 1/N
Chief apologists in this case are fairly known experts on Chub side. They have mostly switched from rather dry and factual analysis to a PR plan.
The PR plan consists into rebranding Russian defenses according to « new realities ».
Pic. 2 Ru defendes as seen in May. 2/N
The PR plan consists into rebranding Russian defenses according to « new realities ».
Pic. 2 Ru defendes as seen in May. 2/N
So far the biggest issues for the line in Zaporizha are these 2 areas.
I have made multiple threads explaining the problem for both sides. But basically the gist of the argument is that Ukrop penetration is creating its own chokepoint into the 1st line backstop at Verbovoe. 3/N
I have made multiple threads explaining the problem for both sides. But basically the gist of the argument is that Ukrop penetration is creating its own chokepoint into the 1st line backstop at Verbovoe. 3/N
After setting up the frame, let’s go to the second lie. In this case it’s projection.
Piggers in fact had counted on Russians leaving their positions at the glacis very fast, that they could squeeze them at their own second base. It’s a basic poursuit that can become a rout. 4/N
Piggers in fact had counted on Russians leaving their positions at the glacis very fast, that they could squeeze them at their own second base. It’s a basic poursuit that can become a rout. 4/N
Instead the Russians did something pretty basic. Around the Orekhov axis, they fought hard and deep supported by an array of assets, behind a killing field.
The Russian tactic in the area was to wear down the maneuver element.
And that’s how it went.
With over 150 assets 5/N
The Russian tactic in the area was to wear down the maneuver element.
And that’s how it went.
With over 150 assets 5/N
Affected. Robotyne took out the main logic behind this offensive. It destroyed the Piggers capability to exploit any breakthrough by heavy assets in the short term.
It took Piggers 3 weeks to reorganize a mechanized push on the other side of the salient with armored assets. 6/N
It took Piggers 3 weeks to reorganize a mechanized push on the other side of the salient with armored assets. 6/N
So suddenly Piggers reverted to a mantra, in line with their usual bullshit.
New mantra is that they are inflicting unsustainable losses because their advance is voluntarily slow. You may have heard this cope last year, from Ziggr side, and yes it was in fact almost similar. 7/N
New mantra is that they are inflicting unsustainable losses because their advance is voluntarily slow. You may have heard this cope last year, from Ziggr side, and yes it was in fact almost similar. 7/N
But this come with a new flavour.
Russia defended too well the first line but incurred heavy losses in doing so and now has no troops to defend the rear. This would be very interesting to analyse if it wasn’t for the 3rd lie. The defense/attack lines at Robotyne are lopsided. 8/N
Russia defended too well the first line but incurred heavy losses in doing so and now has no troops to defend the rear. This would be very interesting to analyse if it wasn’t for the 3rd lie. The defense/attack lines at Robotyne are lopsided. 8/N
At Robotyne, Ukrainian losses dwarf Russian ones. The biggest issues for Russia so far have been 15/20Km strikes and even further, enabled by a tactical choice made for Ukraine by the U.S. and its ISR. Major losses are due to Himars strikes suffering no CBF. 9/N
And even then the situation was so dire, that multiple game changers were touted, 1st of which were the now prevalent cluster ammunition rounds to be fired by artillery.
These didn’t have the effect sold to the press and ironically their first use wasn’t even at the Zapo CS. 10/N
These didn’t have the effect sold to the press and ironically their first use wasn’t even at the Zapo CS. 10/N
But T3 where is the lie?
This tweet is sponsored by Justin Bobr, Sudopizda and the Bro Si gang.
Since roughly the approach. To Robotyne over a month ago, I pointed out that Piggers were changing tactics and moving:
-On foot.
-In small groups.
-Along the forest belts.
Hmmmm. 11/N
This tweet is sponsored by Justin Bobr, Sudopizda and the Bro Si gang.
Since roughly the approach. To Robotyne over a month ago, I pointed out that Piggers were changing tactics and moving:
-On foot.
-In small groups.
-Along the forest belts.
Hmmmm. 11/N
This was then explained by the necessity to … spare vehicles and deal with the minefields. Kaufman himself was shitting his pants 45 days ago…this was described by yours truly by the heavy attrition per attempt UA was suffering. Of which the Bradghey became a poster child. 11/N
In reality the slower pace of the Ikrop advance is explained by the Russian understanding of Ukrop first and foremost goal. That is being able to insert long range fires close enough to collapse large swathes of front and therefore crumble a pathway to better positions. 12/N
Basically the whole point of the current counter which is to sever the « Crimean Land Bridge », relies on a logic I have already explained and is best explained by an American football allegory.
In HandEgg the goal is to score a touchdown in the Oppo’s end zone.
13/N
In HandEgg the goal is to score a touchdown in the Oppo’s end zone.
13/N
This happens by a set of plays to advance a certain minimum distance per set (10yds/4plays).
Each advance shortens the Oppo’s back field. And makes a scoring play more probable. Artillery here is like a QB. The less he has to cover per throw, the more options he has. 14/N
Each advance shortens the Oppo’s back field. And makes a scoring play more probable. Artillery here is like a QB. The less he has to cover per throw, the more options he has. 14/N
Well for as long as the current UA fires aren’t able to significantly lower the ressuply on the backfield. Their troops cannot advance.
Here enters the Surovikin line is wasted mantra.
Off course Chubs would like for Russnya to go back 20km, defending in « depth ». 15/N
Here enters the Surovikin line is wasted mantra.
Off course Chubs would like for Russnya to go back 20km, defending in « depth ». 15/N
This would allow Ukrops to significantly upgrade their artillery coverage. Thus pressing the rest of the Ru lines along Zapo. This also allows Ru to bleed the assault groups in UA side. These are the troops you want out of action. And these are hard KIA/WIA numbers.
16/N
16/N
In short. The PR has definitely switched because this phase of Kontr is running out of time.
Many of the so called Ru issues are in fact shared and apply to UA far worse.
Defense in depth is not reading a manual, but reading the situation.
This cope will last until Nov.
Many of the so called Ru issues are in fact shared and apply to UA far worse.
Defense in depth is not reading a manual, but reading the situation.
This cope will last until Nov.
This is not an endorsement of the Ru strategy. It’s a critique of the Ukro cope.
Maybe this is true and the lines will crumble™️. But so far and given the Kopani adventures of yesterday…
Maybe this is true and the lines will crumble™️. But so far and given the Kopani adventures of yesterday…
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