As a comparative political scientist/sociologist, I’ve always found IR a problematic discipline: IR theories involve a lot of ideology.
In an excellent thread, @mcfaul acknowledges that problem, but ardently defends the opportunities for honest analysis.
In an excellent thread, @mcfaul acknowledges that problem, but ardently defends the opportunities for honest analysis.
I’ll admit that I remain skeptical. Fundamentally, neither realist nor constructivist theories of IR are falsifiable. Too often, they amount to people saying “that war could have been avoided if people had just listened to me”.
That’s the same reason why we’ll never know whether deterrence kept Russia from invading Ukraine or provoked Russia into invasion: theorists/ideologues will have plausible — and untestable — stories either way.
Realism, to my tastes, is worse: it treats states as monolithic entities and largely ignores internal dynamics.
But constructivism problematically tends to reify differences between states — say, democracy vs autocracy — in ways that can obscure causation.
But constructivism problematically tends to reify differences between states — say, democracy vs autocracy — in ways that can obscure causation.
Thus, I’m not totally on board with @McFaul’s argument that conflict Ukraine is mostly about democracy — though it’s more right than Mearsheimer’s balance-of-power argument.
As a matter of analysis, I don’t find either school of IR helpful (though I acknowledge and respect the fact that many do).
But IR theories are powerful in another way: they do sometimes describe the ways in which policymakers see the world.
But IR theories are powerful in another way: they do sometimes describe the ways in which policymakers see the world.
Often, this is because policymakers are schooled — formally or informally — in these theories. Dealing with a complex world, idealized/ideologized perspectives help policymakers keep their respective head-spaces in order.
And thus if we know what school of thought they adhere to, we *might* predict their actions.
The problem, of course, is that these policymakers inevitably run into a world messier than the one they imagine, and then things descend into the kind of process I’m more comfortable analyzing — a process dominated by institutions and incentives.
In other words, let’s imagine Mearsheimer’s ideal world, in which every world leader is a realist. Biden would agree to cease NATO expansion, Putin would withdraw, Zelensky would demur.
But then what?
But then what?
Even in Mearsheimer’s perfectly “realist” world, all three leaders would have to face domestic politics. What do you do about 40+ million Ukrainian citizens who seek more security and prosperity? Security and prosperity that Moscow can’t/won’t provide?
That, frankly, is the strength of @mcfaul’s perspective, and that of a handful of other IR specialists who incorporate comppol perspectives (see @SevaUT, @grudkev, @KimberlyMarten, @CooleyOnEurasia, @HeathershawJ, and my KCL colleagues @ruth_deyermond, @NKuhrt, @dsagramoso.)
As for me, I’m going to stick to my guns on the primacy of domestic politics over international politics.
/END (for now)
/END (for now)
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