عابر السبيل
عابر السبيل

@AbuGelato

20 Tweets 20 reads May 16, 2022
1) [Thread 🧵]
Kurdish jihadists...the struggle between national and religious affiliation
The situation of the Kurds does not seem better than that of the Arabs of the region; Although they have been distinguished by left-wing choices throughout their history,
2) in #Iraq, #Iran, #Turkey and #Syria, the Kurds have a new problem, which began to arise against the background of the growth of puritanical movements in the Middle East, which gave birth to the term "Kurdish Mujahideen."
3) Even though Kurds are between 30 and 45 million, The Kurdish Mujahideen come mainly from Hauerman and Halabja in the #Kurdistan region of #Iraq, which was attacked during the era of former Iraqi dictator Saddam Hussein with chemical weapons,
4) and also from the states of Bingöl, Adıyaman and Batman in eastern and southern #Turkey. Unofficial figures indicate that the number of Iraqi Kurdish fighters in the Islamic State and former "Al-Nusra" Front ranged between 500 and 1,000 people,
5) which is less than the number of the 1,500 armed French mujahideen, for example, and despite the efforts of the "Kurdistan Islamic Union", which is the Kurdish branch of the "Muslim" Brotherhood, and the Salafi-Madkhali oriented Kurdistan "Islamic" Group,
6) more and more younger Kurds are attracted to the ideology of IS, and pan-Islamic dreams. As for the Syrian and Iranian Kurds, and in the absence of any clear statistics on their presence, all indications confirm that their presence is very weak,
7) and the first appearance of the Syrian Kurds in the operations of Jabhat al-Nusra (When it was part of IS) appeared at the hands of the Mujahid Abu Hamza al-Kurdi, who carried out the self-sacrificing operation that targeted the the Ministry of The Syrian Interior in
8) February 2013. After that, the Syrian Kurds no longer appeared to have any role in the Salafi-jihadi organisations, on media at least and beside several IS releases. As for the main and most important origin of the Kurdish mujahideen in the ranks of IS ,
9) who played an essential role in the battles of the city of #Kobani comes from the town/city of #Bingol, eastern #Anatolia, which has a population of 250 thousand citizens, most of whom are Zaza Kurds. (Kurds of Iranian ethnic origin).
10) And in the absence of official statistics on the number of Turkish Kurdish mujahideen who joined IS in #Syria and #Iraq, unofficial numbers confirm that there are more than 600 mujahideen from Bingol city alone in the ranks of IS.
11) Even though unofficial figures suggest the numbers are much higher as well as jihadists from the rest of the Kurdish provinces such as #Diyarbakir, #Bitlis, #Batman, #Adiyaman and others. They come mainly from the second generation of the Kurdish Salafi “Hezbollah” group.
12) #Bingöl is generally considered a conservative Kurdish region, with a majority Zaza and one of the most important voting reservoirs for #Turkey's conservative Islamist parties. Also, its youth were strongly involved in the fight against the Kurdistan Workers Party #PKK
13) (For bigots who think all Kurds are leftist degenerates) since the eighties and nineties of the last century. From their ranks, elements and leaders of the Salafi Kurdish "Hezbollah" emerged notable people such as Haji Bayancuk,
14) who was sentenced to life imprisonment in 2011 for being convicted of "bloody violence" during the 1990s and was succeeded by his son Khalis Biancuk, known as "Abu Handala".
15) But despite that, #Bingöl's participation was significant in the Kurdish revolutions, such as the revolution of Sheikh Saeed at the beginning of the last century, and Bingöl also had some founding leaders of the #PKK, including Muhammad Khairy Dormush, Muhammad Karasungur.
16) Not all those who join IS belong to the poor classes, like Uncle Tsbihaji. Some of the Kurdish mujahideen belong to rich families and educated social classes, including one of the liberal professors at Tigris University in #Diyarbakir,
17) who lost three of his sons who joined to IS in #Syria. "Researchers" and "Media" among Turks and Kurds differ on the reasons for Kurdish youth joining the Salafi Jihadi organisation; some of them claim it's due to an "identity crisis",
18), and some blame it on poverty and marginalisation, as is the case in #Bingol, or on poor religious "education". Others blame it on the reactions of the excessive focus on Kurdish national grievances and the secular Ataturk tendencies, which dominate Kurdish political currents
19), and which seek to exterminate the national cultural identity at the expense of denying the Islamic religious factor, which was the basis for forming this identity for centuries. Others blame the Kurdish parties’ mismanagement of themselves and their lack of democratic
20) frameworks that allow young people to play an active role in the political process, particularly in Iraqi Kurdistan. In the end, religious identity triumphs over national identity, and even the latter is being marginalised, until then people still differ on the main causes.

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