1) [Thread 🧵]
al-Qaeda in the Arabian peninsula was short-lived, and its heads died one after another after a short time in leadership positions. Yet, they left a legacy of literature and guidelines that are used today by IS and some AQ affiliates such al-Shabab.
al-Qaeda in the Arabian peninsula was short-lived, and its heads died one after another after a short time in leadership positions. Yet, they left a legacy of literature and guidelines that are used today by IS and some AQ affiliates such al-Shabab.
2) One such leader who was vocal in military and insurgency strategies is Abdel Aziz al-Muqrin, b1971, who succeeded Khaled Ali Hajj as a leader of al-Qaeda in Saudi Arabia.
al-Muqrin is from the Al-Suwaidi neighbourhood in #Riyadh which is famous for having many SJ sympathizers
al-Muqrin is from the Al-Suwaidi neighbourhood in #Riyadh which is famous for having many SJ sympathizers
3) and has a reputation "for being a bastion of strict Wahhabism" as put by Bradley, John R. in his book, which is famous for being the Saudi #Fallujah among saudis due to the piety of its residents.
4) Al-Muqrin was a high school dropout who was born in Riyadh to middle-class parents. At the age of 19, he was married and had a daughter. In order to fight the Soviets in Afghanistan in 1988, he divorced his wife. (Seems to have been inspired by Ibn Nuhas advices)
5) He later fought in #Bosnia-#Herzegovina and chose to transport weapons from #Spain to #Algeria in the 1990s. He received most of his instruction in Jihadi camps in #Afghanistan and allegedly engaged in combat with Ethiopian forces in the #Ogaden.
6) He was detained in #Ethiopia in 1995 on suspicion of taking part in a failed assassination attempt on late #Egypt president Hosni #Mubarak. After being deported to #SaudiArabia, he was sentenced to two years in prison in #Jeddah.
8) He was a brilliant propagandist who recruited and disseminated his message online. In 2003, Al-Muqrin stated to an Arabic website:
9) Muqrin was a strategist who wrote about insurgency ideology, according to Michael Scheuer, a former #CIA intelligence officer.
jamestown.org
jamestown.org
10) "A Practical Course for Guerilla War", written by Muqrin, has been compared to Management of Savagery by Abu Bakr Naji as a book that impacted Al Qaeda's and the Islamic State's views on guerrilla warfare.
bostonglobe.com
bostonglobe.com
11) Al-Muqrin was listed as the most wanted terrorist by #SaudiArabia on its second official list. His group claimed responsibility for many attacks on Westerners in Saudi Arabia in 2004, including the shooting in June 2004 that left #BBC correspondent Frank Gardner gravely
12) injured and cameraman Simon Cumbers dead, as well as the abduction and beheading of American contractor Paul Johnson. Al-Muqrin and a number of his friends were assassinated by Saudi police commandos on the same day that Johnson was killed in a shootout
13) at a gas station in downtown Riyadh, and shortly before his death al-Muqrin founded the online magazine Al-Khansaain 2004, procedures were discovered posted online under al-Muqrin's name containing the itinerary, paths of travel, and security personnel of Prince Nayef
14) bin Abdel Aziz 8Most hated al-Saud figure among Islamists), and plans to assassinate him with RPGs and explosives, but al-Muqrin died before the plans materialized.
So now to the doctrine part, what is al-Muqrins war doctrine against the "infidels"?
So now to the doctrine part, what is al-Muqrins war doctrine against the "infidels"?
15) As mentioned earlier al-Muqrin's publications were influential in developing al-Qaeda's military doctrine and strategy. He promotes "Jewish and Christian" goals as suitable and legitimate in the conflict, among other reasons. (Something IS gladly acted upon by the letter)
16) "A Practical Course in Guerilla War" is a collection of courses provided in twelve chapters. Each chapter focuses on a specific topic (for example, how to communicate in secret). The text is well-written and concise.
17) The Arabic edition contains 78 pages (the translated editions are slightly longer). Its content, duration, and organisation show that the material is evidently meant to be used for the training of relatively novice recruits for various types of urban operations.
18) An intriguing aspect worth noticing is that Al-Muqrin emphasises the significance of being able to break contact with an opponent in an urban environment, even when the cell is surrounded. Thus, Al-Muqrin was not an unquestioning supporter of, say, suicide attacks,
19) but appears to have viewed experienced and trained troops as a resource that should be used intelligently, which is consistent with the factors that had moulded the IRA's behaviour for many years.
20) Unlike the IRA, which decided to surrender if the situation was hopeless, Al-Muqrin and many of his supporters refused to be arrested alive, if only to achieve martyrdom. It should be underlined that, against this backdrop,
21) one can see al-death Baghdadi as a means of achieving martyrdom while avoiding humiliation by allowing oneself to be arrested alive (Victory or martyrdom as the Quran states)
22) The similarities stem largely from the fact that Al-Muqrin and many other jihadist strategists drew inspiration from the same sources as the IRA's strategists: Mao Tse-Tung and the North Vietnamese military Vo Nguyen Giap.
23) This is paradoxical given that Michael Collins, one of the most exemplary leaders of the Irish Republicans, was a significant source of inspiration for Giap. (Something Zealots will never comprehend due to their simpleton mindset)
24) Al-Muqrin begins his essay with a brief discussion of battle. War, according to him, is a type of confrontation between two opposing parties. War or conflict can be fought at various levels, such as between individuals, organisations, societies, or states.
25) Depending on the conditions of the individual instance, this combat, or war, may have varied strategic goals, such as forcing the opponent into surrender, destroying him, or simply preserving himself.
26) Al-Muqrin also addresses the causes of conflict in terms of just and unjust wars. Those who are oppressed, displaced, living under oppressive authority, or subjected to some type of aggression fight just wars.
27) The war's ultimate goal is to put an end to this and subsequently implement a just social structure governed by Sharia. Unjust conflicts are simplified in the other direction. Such conflicts are fought against the downtrodden, as well as their ideas and values.
28) Some Right-wing conservative pundits might feel tempted to interpret this to suggest that al-Muqrin claims that only Muslims can wage righteous wars.
29) A conflict, according to Al-Muqrin, might take several forms. A regular war, a cold war, a complete war, and lastly an unconventional conflict are all possibilities. al-Muqrin focuses on non-conventional wars, with the phrase "guerrilla war" serving as a synonym.
30) The connection between Mao and Giap becomes evident as a result of this examination. Guerrilla warfare, according to Al-Muqrin, is a revolutionary battle in which the population, in whole or in part, is mobilised to fight the incumbent or an invading army.
31) (Like al-Najis Management of Savagery, and IS main doctrine). A guerrilla war is fought by the weaker side of a battle using the most basic techniques feasible against a much stronger opponent. (As coined by Robert Taber in the War of the flea)
32) The struggle's strategic goal is the establishment of a governance system that is genuine to Muslim beliefs, devoid of deviations and non-orthodox individuals. According to Al-Muqrin, such guerilla warfare will be waged in three stages,
33) which may overlap in practice. Certain political and military characteristics describe the first phase of the guerrilla war (strategic defence). According to Al-Muqrin, opponents would use propaganda to dehumanise the guerrillas,
34) such as calling them "murderers," "terrorists," "rebels," and so on. In this phase, it is critical for the guerrillas to reply to this propaganda by explaining to the people what the fight is actually about and why the guerrillas' use of force is justified.
35) According to al-Muqrin, such an information campaign must be linked with a properly thought-out plan about how the guerrillas use force; in order for the guerrillas to maintain their credibility, tremendous importance should be placed on the selection of targets.
36) Examples of permissible goals are expressly referred to as "Jewish and Christian goals," as these can be articulated and explained as legitimate goals in the broader war against Christianity and Judaism that stands in the way of Muslim dominance.
37) To weary the opponent, the fight must be carried out across as vast an area as possible in the form of many little attacks (Screaming IS everywhere here).
38) Larger conflicts, according to Al-Muqrin, should be avoided because the insurgents have very little chance of winning during this time (It Seems IS cadre forgot this part).
39) The second phase of the guerrilla war (relative strategic balance) is distinguished by the opponent's failure to force a quick decision through superiority.
40) Instead, the opponent begins to investigate different political possibilities, such as negotiations. According to al-Muqrin, such a development should be confronted with greater operational tempo and efforts to explain the nature of the struggle.
41) The goal is to demonstrate that the stronger side lacks legitimacy and the ability to govern. During this phase, the stronger side will retreat, allowing for some territorial control. Negotiations may probably begin during this phase, which al-Muqrin says is permissible
42) as long as the military activity is not disrupted (that is, a ceasefire is not relevant). The circumstances for the enemy's capitulation are of great interest during any negotiations.
43) The third (decisive) phase indicates that the opponent is about to crumble. This can be hastened via infiltration of the security system, in which fractures of confidence between leadership and officials can be exploited to hasten the process.
44) This phase is marked by sudden occurrences in which the stronger party withdraws from areas of the country. The guerrillas must then be ready to step into this power vacuum. There is no need for negotiations during this stage.
45) The opponent must be disheartened and compelled to surrender as soon as feasible. Sharia courts will be established to try people who have strayed from the path of Islam. During this phase, it is critical that the movement maintains a functional guerrilla capability in
46) the event that the opponent gathers strength and strikes back.
47) For those who wish to improve their knowledge, there is a lot to read. Aside from the main book (Which I discourage zealots from reading), the Norwegian researcher Thomas Hegghammer's book "Jihad in Saudi Arabia: Violence and Pan-Islamism since 1979" should be read.
48) This book provides a longer and more in-depth look at jihadism in Saudi Arabia. It is a well-written, easy-to-read book that has become a standard work in the subject.
49) The 2018 documentary "Path of Blood: The Hidden Face of Terrorism" was directed by British filmmaker Jonathan Hacker. This is an intriguing film that depicts the Jihadi campaign from the inside, using film snippets from the Jihadists themselves
50) (which were later seized by the Saudi authorities). It's an intriguing film, but it may require some prior information to understand it properly. 👀
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P.s. Don't ask for links like a Panjeet
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P.s. Don't ask for links like a Panjeet
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