This is a good case study in the manipulative dishonesty of pro-IS media narratives. It's remiscent of how the situation in Syria was oversimplified to justify takfir and slaughter of both the righteous and wicked.
First, the town is more like a collection of villages with several groups present, including AQ-linked JNIM.
JNIM has controlled urban centers in the past, but now generally avoids urban areas precisely because it means being exposed to airstrikes.
JNIM has controlled urban centers in the past, but now generally avoids urban areas precisely because it means being exposed to airstrikes.
JNIM will also cut deals with a variety of local militias, including offering guarantees of protection, in exchange for taxes and assurances that local communes will implement sharia.
Government-aligned militias are sometimes forced into submission to JNIM like this by force.
Government-aligned militias are sometimes forced into submission to JNIM like this by force.
Communities can go back and forth from the government influence to JNIM influence in this way. In either case, the actual influence of JNIM or the government in an area may be quite limited, with the local militias mainly handling security.
Local militias are mainly concerned with local aims - maintaining control of their own area, or gaining local political autonomy. They don't have any trans-national agenda, or even necessarily any aims to overthrow the Malian government.
They're thus not a priority for airstrikes.
ISGS took control of the main administrative center of this area, and when JNIM does the same, the government typically does send in reinforcements including air support.
ISGS took control of the main administrative center of this area, and when JNIM does the same, the government typically does send in reinforcements including air support.
JNIM and ISGS are both actively working to overthrow the government, so the government is not going to tolerate either of them controlling administrative centers. Local militias are also much more willing to give concessions to the government and work with them than JNIM or ISGS.
The post I'm responding to makes it seem as if the militias who pay protection money to JNIM and JNIM are one unit fighting together against ISGS with French air support (I only know of Malian air support).
The reality is just that ISGS have presented an easy target.
The reality is just that ISGS have presented an easy target.
They're probably going to loot the town for supplies and then withdraw. It makes strategic and logistical sense, and it also helps fuel media narratives, which are key for IS's more global, younger, and tech savvy demographic, as opposed to local and traditional JNIM focus.
It's similar to IS narratives in Yemen and Syria, in that using political maneuvering to gain influence and limit attack surface area is painted as "allying with the murtadin," although they are periodically fighting these same "murtadin" and pushing them to comply with sharia.
Most of the people who eat up these overly simplistic narratives won't make it through a thread of this length, and since respect for elders and scholars is disintegrating everywhere and ignorance is proliferating, these dishonest methods are guaranteed (short-term) success.
The ummah is trapped between two tendencies of deviation - factions like the ikhwan, who think that engaging in kufr is hikmah, and factions like IS that think that hikmah is kufr.
May Allah grant us the ability to recognize the truth, love it, and to act in accordance with it.
May Allah grant us the ability to recognize the truth, love it, and to act in accordance with it.
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