"Carrier is dead" proponents try to paint the picture of a PLARF DF-21 against the USS Gerald Ford alone and unafraid in WestPac, but this is far from reality.
While ASBMs/ASCMs present a credible threat, they're not the panacea they're made out to be.
Thread 1/
While ASBMs/ASCMs present a credible threat, they're not the panacea they're made out to be.
Thread 1/
A USN CSG possesses an array of capabilities that could frustrate missiles but there are also capabilities external to the CSG that would contribute as well.
1) In high-end conflict, US would employ multi-domain capabilities to frustrate PLA ISR assets that PRC would need... 2/
1) In high-end conflict, US would employ multi-domain capabilities to frustrate PLA ISR assets that PRC would need... 2/
...to find & target our CVNs in the 1st place, incl CAPs to tgt PLA airborne ISR (eg maritime patrol A/C), ASW, & even counterspace to degrade PRC space-based ISR. This is the first layer of CVN defense: if they can't find them, they can't kill them. 3/
swfound.org
swfound.org
2) US could tgt other PLA assets (other than ISR) used in ASM kill chain *before* they could be brought to bear against US assets--so-called "left of launch" efforts. Submarine-, ship-, ground-, or air-launched missiles to tgt PLA C2 nodes, known fwd launch areas, or... 4/
...TELs themselves to degrade PLA ASM capability/capacity. Could also leverage cyber/NAVWAR to frustrate precise tgt'ing efforts needed to hit a moving object at such great distance (it ain't easy). 5/
vandenberg.spaceforce.mil
vandenberg.spaceforce.mil
3) If PLA ASMs do get airborne, CSG defense is still an option. CSGs typically contain at least 1x CG & a squadron or 2 of DDGs that could employ SM-3 and SM-6 interceptors to shoot them down. Could also use EW to jam/spoof the terminal guidance of the missiles, & of course... 6/
...deceptive countermeasures to distract.
4) Even if an ASM gets through all that, there is no guarantee it would kill a supercarrier. First, USN damage control capability is legendary. WW2 CV Yorktown severely damaged by aerial bombs at Coral Sea but saved by armor... 7/
4) Even if an ASM gets through all that, there is no guarantee it would kill a supercarrier. First, USN damage control capability is legendary. WW2 CV Yorktown severely damaged by aerial bombs at Coral Sea but saved by armor... 7/
...compartmentalized design, & expert DC parties. It was repaired in time to see action <1mo later at Midway & was hit again by both bombs & torpedoes. Even after being struck, it stayed in action again thru DC, & only finally sunk 3 days later when it was again torpedoed... 8/
...by IJN subs while being towed and defenseless.
In 2005, a decomm'ed CV USS America was tgt of SINKEX. Detailed results are still classified & were used to improve designs of current Ford class. Fact that America took *4 weeks* of ordnance w/ *NO* DC crew aboard, &... 9/
In 2005, a decomm'ed CV USS America was tgt of SINKEX. Detailed results are still classified & were used to improve designs of current Ford class. Fact that America took *4 weeks* of ordnance w/ *NO* DC crew aboard, &... 9/
...final sinking only being accomplished by a demo team setting charges at specific locations throughout the ship, speaks volumes about modern carrier survivability.
Counterarguments: But the Ukrainians sank the Moskva! Several factors differentiate the case. 10/
Counterarguments: But the Ukrainians sank the Moskva! Several factors differentiate the case. 10/
1) Again, damage control. Soviet Navy was never the pride of its military, & Russian Navy has fallen into further disrepair. RUS DC simply doesn't compare to USN.
2) According to OSINT, UKR needed US intel to tgt Moskva. Likely wouldn't have been able to w/o US assistance. 11/
2) According to OSINT, UKR needed US intel to tgt Moskva. Likely wouldn't have been able to w/o US assistance. 11/
3) Moskva was designed to deliver a punch, but not take one. As stated above, US CVNs are designed to take punches--many of them. Moskva was also operating at very close range to the UKR coast bc the Neptune missiles weren't previously operational, so tgt'ing was much easier. 12/
Also, a logical counterpoint to "carrier is dead": if the Chinese were themselves convinced of US CVN vulnerability to their own missiles, why are they building massive CVs of their own? They clearly believe that even in medium- to long-term CVs possess enduring utility. 13/
Also a number of ways to further mitigate precision strike threat against carriers, incl use of deception (EMCON, stealth, decoys, poisoning data), horizontal escalation to compel PRC to expend time & resources elsewhere, & extending range of CSG strike assets. 14/
Further reading below for the interested or still skeptical, but although ASMs present a credible threat to USN shipping that demand mitigation, they are far from the silver bullets they're often portrayed as. 15/
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