So I think this article in FP today (foreignpolicy.com) is...well, I think it's really quite bad?
The idea is that the Ukraine War is like WWI in that everyone is all-in on a minor conflict that won't be worth the cost and the escalation risks are big.
And...no? 1/
The idea is that the Ukraine War is like WWI in that everyone is all-in on a minor conflict that won't be worth the cost and the escalation risks are big.
And...no? 1/
I mean, the author is right about one thing: this isn't WWII either...but if anyone said it was, I missed that.
The author is from the Quincy Institute, so naturally there's some reheated Mearsheimer, 'this isn't all Russia's fault, you taunted them' nonsense. 2/
The author is from the Quincy Institute, so naturally there's some reheated Mearsheimer, 'this isn't all Russia's fault, you taunted them' nonsense. 2/
And frankly I think that line is rubbish. Ukrainians made their own choices, independent of everyone else. Putin tried to reassert hegemony and he's failing.
Ukraine didn't have a green light into NATO or even really the EU before Putin invaded. 3/
Ukraine didn't have a green light into NATO or even really the EU before Putin invaded. 3/
Moreover, Putin has just been *exceptionally* clear that this is in service to an ideological project of reuniting what he sees as different branches of the Russian people.
And you could argue that in a realist paradigm we have to humor him except no, we really don't. 4/
And you could argue that in a realist paradigm we have to humor him except no, we really don't. 4/
If this is "the strong do what they will, the weak suffer what they must" - if that amoral calculus is where we are...well Woe on Vladimir Putin because it turns out Ukraine is strong and he is weak.
Sucks man, this is why war is risky. 5/
Sucks man, this is why war is risky. 5/
Lieven, the author, then follows this with a bunch of hemming and hawing about German responsibility and war crimes in WWI and while no one was exactly covered with glory in WWI I don't think you can 'both sides' German behavior in WWI either. 6/
Go read Isabell Hull's Absolute Destruction if you don't know what I mean there (amazon.com), the imperial German army had some unique problems even by the rock-bottom low standards of the armies of the day. 7/
But the unstated implication here is that you could *also* both sides the current War in Ukraine, which you obviously can't in a war where Ukraine confines its attacks to its own soil - despite the capability to strike more extensively into, say, Belgorod... 8/
...while Russia just does war crimes as standard practice.
He says "we should be very careful not to portray these crimes as in some way culturally special to Russians" but also war crime's don't just *happen* - on this see me: foreignpolicy.com 9/
He says "we should be very careful not to portray these crimes as in some way culturally special to Russians" but also war crime's don't just *happen* - on this see me: foreignpolicy.com 9/
Like, I can't stress this enough: the Russian army *practiced* how to do war crimes in Syria and Chechnya. Some armies try to avoid doing war crimes, the Russians *practice* how to do them with maximum effect.
So yeah, there's something specific going on here. 10/
So yeah, there's something specific going on here. 10/
But the biggest problem with this article is the basic WWI analogy is frankly stupid. WWI was a war between the great powers, at the start. There is between 0 and 1 Great Power currently at war in Europe. Not 2, not 3: 0 or 1 depending on how dim your view of Russian power. 11/
The War in Ukraine isn't WWI or WWII. It's Vietnam - where the Soviet Union calmly supplied PAVN and the NLF for a mix of realpolitik and ideological reasons. That didn't result in nuclear escalation, even though a great power - the USA - invested big and lost. 12/
Or it's Afghanistan (1979-1989), where the United States supplied the mujahideen for a mix of realpolitik and ideological reasons.
That didn't result in nuclear escalation, even though a great power - the USSR - invested big and lost big. 13/
That didn't result in nuclear escalation, even though a great power - the USSR - invested big and lost big. 13/
Trying to make this the Guns of August is just such a tortured analogy, when we've danced this dance before a bunch of times.
Frontiers shift when great powers get bloody noses on them, it happens a lot and yet somehow we're not on Nuclear Apocalypse VII, the Nukes Awaken. 14/
Frontiers shift when great powers get bloody noses on them, it happens a lot and yet somehow we're not on Nuclear Apocalypse VII, the Nukes Awaken. 14/
And while we're here, this bit is just absurd.
First, the claim "thirty years ago" most Americans would have assumed Crimea was part of Russia - since when was American geographically illiteracy a factor in sovereignty or international law or anything, really? 15/
First, the claim "thirty years ago" most Americans would have assumed Crimea was part of Russia - since when was American geographically illiteracy a factor in sovereignty or international law or anything, really? 15/
30y ago was 1992! Ukraine was not part of the USSR anymore, and everyone - including Russia - quickly agreed *in writing* (en.wikipedia.org) that Crimea was Ukraine. In WRITING, I feel I cannot shout that enough.
There was a deal, signed on the line that is dotted! 16/
There was a deal, signed on the line that is dotted! 16/
His argument here is, "well, this has only been part of Ukraine for 68 years when it was legally transferred and then in 1994 - 28 years ago - everyone re-agreed on all of that so, I mean, was it ever really theirs?" 17/
So, I assume for this guy when Belgium attempts to reconquer Congo - I mean, it's only been 62 years there! - that would be totally fine? I mean, would the least well informed, dumbest American I could find even notice?
18/
18/
I point out this garbage argument because it's revealing about the whole thing - Lieven is pretending to be a hard, cold realist, but that case is just extremely weak because Russia is *losing* without direct NATO military intervention...19/
...so here comes this moralizing argument - 'well, was it really ever theirs to begin with' - at the tail end of an article that has spent paragraphs explaining that moralizing arguments *don't matter* and that everything is really just realpolitik: interests and escalation. 20/
Of course it's not the only time he does this because we also have this moment here, where he hides his obvious argument behind, "well, will the historians of the future...?" like we're all 'just asking questions' here. 21/
And I want to scream to this fellow: Stop Cowering! Scratch the surface and what you get is an argument that nukes gives Putin the right to rape and murder Eastern European countries without interference.
That's your 'realpolitik' argument, so say that and be done with it.🤮22/
That's your 'realpolitik' argument, so say that and be done with it.🤮22/
For my part, I think opportunities where national interest and the Right Thing line up are rare and should absolutely be seized. Defending Ukraine is the Right Thing, but this is also the biggest, cheapest international win the USA+NATO has scored in *decades*. 23/
We should be concerned to avoid escalation, which is why we forswore any direct intervention at the outset. So now the escalation risk is in Putin's hands, not ours - other countries have agency! If Putin is a madman that would rather end the world than admit the mistake...24/
...then the world ends and there's nothing we can *or could ever* do about it.
Anyway, I thought this was a pretty bad take, though I'm glad FP ran it because some bad ideas should have their rank aired in public. foreignpolicy.com /end
Anyway, I thought this was a pretty bad take, though I'm glad FP ran it because some bad ideas should have their rank aired in public. foreignpolicy.com /end
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