أبو يحيى الكردي
أبو يحيى الكردي

@MillahAsSalaf

30 Tweets 15 reads Oct 31, 2022
In this thread, our dear brother `Abdullāh al-Andalusī claims the jihādī methodology is a weak opinion for reasons I’ll go through in steps.
Firstly, he says it’s weak because it’s applying rulings relating to khulafā’ who abandon the Sharī`ah to rulers of modern nation-states.
The problem is that the ruling on khurūj doesn’t only apply to apostate khulafā’, this is his opinion and the opinion of HT that has no scholarly basis.
He then compares jihādīs to Madkhalīs for treating today’s rulers with rulings which historically applied to khulafā’.
We say that there’s no distinction between the two prescribed by the Sharī`ah, so if one of today’s rulers were to implement the Sharī`ah tomorrow and was given bay`ah by ahlul-hal wa’l-`aqd, Madkhalīs would be correct in calling for obedience towards him.
Having a shallow understanding of the Qur`ān and Sunnah, although true for Madkhalīs and many jihādīs, is not why people think we must either obey the rulers or rebel against them. The Sharī`ah prescribes these approaches and doesn’t distinguish between khulafā’ and other rulers.
Government lies against the mujāhidīn is not a reason for abandoning jihād. The Messenger ﷺ started with few followers and many enemies who made up lies against him, accusing him of being a liar, magician and insane.
It’s also not correct to say these lies would necessarily lead to the people supporting their secular governments over the mujāhidīn. In Syria for instance, Islāmic groups became dominant amongst the opposition partly because they managed to gain the most popular support.
This was done by their greater efficiency against the Asad regime and provisions for the people.
No insurgency can survive and win against a much larger and more advanced enemy, especially when a superpower like America is involved, without popular constituency.
This is because an insurgency would be gradually annihilated if they didn’t keep gaining new fighters.
The fact the mujāhidīn of Afghānistān managed to be victorious showed that they have a level of popular support and constituency.
Years of secularism impacting the mentality of the Muslim masses doesn’t necessarily make them oppose the mujāhidīn and support the existing secular governments against them.
Since these regimes are oppressive and extremely incompetent, the mujāhidīn can offer the people a way out and provide those within their territories better lives by allowing greater political freedom and providing charity to those in need.
The people would then see them as a much better alternative to the government and flock to live under them and even support them. There are studies showing this to be true in practice, with many preferring to go to jihadī-run Shar`ī courts over the government’s corrupt ones.
This is of course, also a good opportunity for da`wah to the ignorant masses who were purposely kept ignorant by the ruling regimes.
Da`wah to the people and political authorities is severely repressed by secular regimes.
This is exactly the problem with HT’s method of “revolution through da`wah” and why they haven’t achieved anything significant. Don’t the mujāhidīn provide a much better opportunity for da`wah by displaying the justice of Islām in practice rather than just theory?
The mujāhidīn aren’t “not achieving anything” by attacking government targets. The point of an insurgency is to financially drain the enemy to the point of retreat, and by constantly doing these attacks, it makes foreign involvement the opposite of beneficial and profitable.
Secular governments like the Asad regime have been painting the mujāhidīn as the cause for everything wrong in Muslim countries, but the masses, like those in Syria, continue to support them because they’re fed up with their governments’ lies and don’t seriously consider them.
The existence of takfīrī-minded people amongst jihādīs doesn’t nullify the obligation of jihād and they’ve existed throughout almost all of Islāmic history since the time of the Sahābah.
The lack of scholars and people of authority amongst the mujāhidīn is something I’ve criticised the jihādī movement for, and they’re necessary to combat the rise of takfīrī trends emerging from it. They’re also necessary for better planning and implementation of strategies.
It’s untrue that the mujāhidīn only found success in failed states who are so dysfunctional and weak. The mujāhidīn of Afghānistān defeated both America and the Soviet Union.
Saying that territory controlled by mujāhidīn are “weak” is part of Western psychological propaganda.
The kuffār want us to believe we can only defeat them if we have the same level of technological advancement as them, since it keeps us subservient to them.
As mentioned earlier however, the point of an insurgency is to financially drain the enemy to the point of retreat.
This relies on organisation and popular constituency, and a high-tech military force would be counter-productive, because they are extremely expensive to maintain while the cheap weapons used by the mujāhidīn cost much less, and an insurgency is a war of financial sustainability.
Lastly, to say smaller Islāmic emirates won’t re-establish the Khilāfah is false. Building the Khilāfah is a long process that takes a sufficient number of emirates emerging over time to eventually build, but this doesn’t mean the jihādī methodology cannot accomplish it.
Establishing the Khilāfah doesn’t mean jihādī-controlled lands like Afghānistān need to wage war against more powerful states and absorb them, it simply requires patience in waiting for local mujāhidīn in different countries to gather the ability and seize power.
HT’s argument of replicating the “Makkan Phase” holds no weight, because that phase happened before the revelation of jihād. Once the revelation has come down, the obligations that come with it have also come down and it’s not permissible to abstain from it.
I don’t know how HT condemns the Muslim Brotherhood for misusing the “Makkan Phase” to justify gradualism, but end up misusing the same part of Islāmic history to justify their own methodology anyways.
Da`wah and spreading knowledge is something we should do, but them being used as the methodology to establish the Sharī`ah is flawed, not only because of the heavy state repression that makes it nearly impossible but also state support for secular, Madkhalī and quietist da`wah.
To say that we can’t treat modern secular rulers and governments as apostates but rather kuffār asliyyīn in an age of jāhiliyyah has no basis in the Sharī`ah. These authorities were raised as Muslims and only left the Dīn when they started committing nullifiers of Islām.
It’s also incorrect to say they’re just ignorant and need da`wah, because they nullify Islām in things which are known by necessity, such as adhering to secularism and legalising clear prohibitions in the Sharī`ah like khamr and ribā’.
The hujjah is already established, but they’re either arrogant, negligent or secretly disbelieve in Islām and hate it. It’s not only nearly impossible to reach them to give them da`wah safely without being silenced in the first place, but they likely also won’t heed your call.
In regards to not fighting them because they’re too dangerous, then there are conditions to rebel against apostate rulers, with one of them being possession of ability, but this at best means delaying jihād to gather the ability, not abandoning it altogether.
And āmīn to your du`ā’ for Allāh ﷻ to make us all from the strangers. May He guide you, me, the rest of the ummah and the mushrikīn to the Straight Path.

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