DISCUSSION - The talk of the superiority or the capability of the Soviet/Russian armor to its adversaries or vice versa has been the central point of many military-related conversations. Though as pointed out in the preface, I will not be discussing the capability of these
vehicles from a larger strategic standpoint - as these vehicles exist in brigades or regimental levels. I will be looking more into the tactical sphere and the individual element of the vehicles. And through this method, I will categorize this discussion in five parts.
A: The independent variables of vehicles from
B: Performances in the past and performances of now C: General application of the βtankβ in Ukraine
D: Capacity vs Capability
E: Theory vs Reality
B: Performances in the past and performances of now C: General application of the βtankβ in Ukraine
D: Capacity vs Capability
E: Theory vs Reality
Now I do disclaim these points made are not definitely a state of fact as there can be deviances and differences depending on various situations.
- THE INDEPENDENT VARIABLES
1) As elaborated on the excruciatingly long thread of content varying from protection, ammunition, optics
- THE INDEPENDENT VARIABLES
1) As elaborated on the excruciatingly long thread of content varying from protection, ammunition, optics
fire fighting equipment, mobility and other small details these two vehicles have varying appearances and the way they were designed.
1.1) As far as ergonomics go, the emphasis on the size of the T-72M and T-72B are partially different but are pretty identical in stature
1.1) As far as ergonomics go, the emphasis on the size of the T-72M and T-72B are partially different but are pretty identical in stature
considering much of the internal compartment is retained. The nature of the vehicle being short in height with a reduced crew compartment size due to the removal of the loader allows the vehicle to sustain a low silhouette in a defensive environment which the vehicle requires to
be in hull-down position. The virtually smaller size of the turret of the T-72M/B in comparison to the Leopard 2A4 establishes points where the difficulty of acquisition and spotting of the concealed tank is present from a horizontal plane.
1.2) The turret size of the Leopard 2A4 as addressed is to establish the two postures of armor design - an isolated bustle containing ready-ammunition and a fighting compartment for the loader. Though in simple discussion to the point made in 1b It is logically ideal for a more
concealed and smaller turret to be more survivable and noticeable in a defensive position, and these points would be addressed later.
2) The discussion of armor is very difficult as for the case of the T-72M/M1/Bβs armour profile, the past combat records and assessments that has
2) The discussion of armor is very difficult as for the case of the T-72M/M1/Bβs armour profile, the past combat records and assessments that has
been available from Western and Soviet analysts allow for a detailed understanding of the composition and the capabilities of the armour that is provided on the tank. However for the case of the Leopard 2A4, the composition of the internal space armour is not publicly available
and must be addressed through some calculated assumptions and theoretical numbers. (Which I will not argue here).
- THE INDEPENDENT VARIABLES
1) As elaborated on the excruciatingly long thread of content varying from protection, ammunition, optics, fire fighting equipment
- THE INDEPENDENT VARIABLES
1) As elaborated on the excruciatingly long thread of content varying from protection, ammunition, optics, fire fighting equipment
mobility and other small details these two vehicles have varying appearances and the way they were designed.
1.1) As far as ergonomics go, the emphasis on the size of the T-72M and T-72B are partially different but are pretty identical in stature, considering much of the
1.1) As far as ergonomics go, the emphasis on the size of the T-72M and T-72B are partially different but are pretty identical in stature, considering much of the
internal compartment is retained. The nature of the vehicle being short in height with a reduced crew compartment size due to the removal of the loader allows the vehicle to sustain a low silhouette in a defensive environment which the vehicle requires to be in hull-down position
The virtually smaller size of the turret of the T-72M/B in comparison to the Leopard 2A4 establishes points where the difficulty of acquisition and spotting of the concealed tank is present from a horizontal plane.
1.2) The turret size of the Leopard 2A4 as addressed is to establish the two postures of armor design - an isolated bustle containing ready-ammunition and a fighting compartment for the loader. Though in simple discussion to the point made in 1b It is logically ideal for a more
concealed and smaller turret to be more survivable and noticeable in a defensive position, and these points would be addressed later.
2) The discussion of armor is very difficult as for the case of the T-72M/M1/Bβs armour profile, the past combat records and assessments that has
2) The discussion of armor is very difficult as for the case of the T-72M/M1/Bβs armour profile, the past combat records and assessments that has
been available from Western and Soviet analysts allow for a detailed understanding of the composition and the capabilities of the armour that is provided on the tank. However for the case of the Leopard 2A4, the composition of the internal space armour is not publicly available
and must be addressed through some calculated assumptions and theoretical numbers. (Which I will not argue here).
2.1) On the basics of protection, the Leopard 2A4βs frontal engagement capability can potentially be survivable or not against the standard 3BM42 Mango munitions
2.1) On the basics of protection, the Leopard 2A4βs frontal engagement capability can potentially be survivable or not against the standard 3BM42 Mango munitions
utilized by the RuA, however it must be noted there are cases Ukrainian and Russian armor with Kontakt-1/5 protection on its hull/turret have indentations of APFSDS projectiles (though not specific which) penetrating them. However these points are not viable for discussion on the
capabilities of protection.
2.2) However a general observation can be made on the penetrative capabilities of the 2A4βs L/44 utilized DM53 munitions on T-72M/B models based on analysis of the protective capabilities of the tanks including Bβs which in The Chieftain says
2.2) However a general observation can be made on the penetrative capabilities of the 2A4βs L/44 utilized DM53 munitions on T-72M/B models based on analysis of the protective capabilities of the tanks including Bβs which in The Chieftain says
β[[Challenger 2] will take a couple of knocks from a Russian tank and keep fighting, whereas if the Russian tank gets hit. I wouldn't put my money on it surviving.β (Times Radio). Though it must be understood the measurements of the capabilities of the raw protection of the T-72B
with Kontakt-1 is far less than that of the T-72B3/T-80BVM/T-90M which is far superior and improved external protective layers and developed reactive armour designed against KE penetrators.
2.3) On the matter of the survivability of the crew, it is more of agreeable that the design feature of the Leopard 2A4 identifies the importance of isolating elements of the ammunition from its crew. The argument of the stowed reserve ammunition is a point for later.
This discussion of protection and ergonomics is the same for the T-72 where its appearance minimizes the chances of a direct hit to the ammunition and considers the safety such as escape hatches for the driver and independent hatches for both the gunner and commander.
However it can be agreed on the features internally to mitigate fires and the safety measure is more advanced on the 2A4.
3) Carrying over from the point of safety features of the vehicle, the stowage of ammunition and its design policies is dependent on the style of warfare that was imagined. An important point is that often the Soviet/Russian tanks have known to cook-off very well with its turret
flying off due to the carousel is a part-misconception. Studies have identified that the common case for these secondary-burnouts to be majority from the stowed reserve ammunition around the vehicle than the ammunition in the AZ autoloader. Indeed a similar point can be made for
the stowage of the 2A4 with its 27 spare munitions in its hull front. In these cases troops can improve by reducing the stowed ammunition amount minimizing risks of secondary explosions from initial impact.
3.1) In consideration of the argument between the loader and the autoloader, it is necessary to understand the advantages and disadvantages each provides. The autoloader can sustain a near-constant reload rate for the gun with the gunner only needing to select the particular
ammunition. If the T-72 is required to perform a rapid fire mission of 15~20 HE-Frag rounds into enemy positions, it can be more consistent than a manual loader.
3.2) The manual loader oppositely can perform far better than an autoloader in the first 5~10 rounds in comparison to
3.2) The manual loader oppositely can perform far better than an autoloader in the first 5~10 rounds in comparison to
the autoloader if the trained crew is far skilled and more capable of handling a ~20kg munition into the breech - which requires extensive training and expertise. In the case of tank-to-tank engagements of tank-to-anti tank engagements, these first two rounds are often seen as
the most important. Considering the first round or two does not hit the target, rapid reload is required to supply the breech with the required munition to make a kill which can be done by a manual loader. Vehicle kills donβt consist of a simple explosion, but are separated by
mobility, firepower, mission and catastrophic kills. In many occasions vehicles which received an initial hit do not necessarily cook out but are mobility kills.
3.3) Additionally the additional crew can provide a hand for maintenance and replace an injured crew in the case of
3.3) Additionally the additional crew can provide a hand for maintenance and replace an injured crew in the case of
impact, while in the case for the 72M/B the gunner cannot replace the commander due to the lack of an independent optical device which the commander has.
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