2/ In this terrific piece @IanTalley & @anthonydb track shipments of key components for the Russian military industry, including to sanctioned entities, from China. Key to the piece is Russian and Chinese customs data provided to @WSJ team by @C4ADS.
3/ The article documents shipments of military or dual use technology that happened after 2/24, including parts for 96L6E mobile radar unit supplied by π¨π³ Taly Aviation Technologies Corp. on 10/4 to sanctioned π·πΊ Almaz Antey. Other examples are listed below π
5/ And this is where questions start to emerge. It has always been difficult to track π¨π³π·πΊ arms trade even before the sanctions, and it became even harder after 2018 designations against some PLA individuals and bodies in accordance with CAATSA. home.treasury.gov
7/ In March π·πΊ customs stopped publishing its data, as @UliaStarostina documents in her analysis for @CEIP_Politika. Analysts can now rely on data of Russia's trading partners to do some estimates... or rely on Russian government data leaked by someone. carnegieendowment.org
8/ In case of π¨π³π·πΊ mil-tech cooperation, particularly detailing separate transactions, analysts and journalists will increasingly have to rely on data leaked by π·πΊ government insiders, available on marketplaces for hacked data, or shared by contacts in Western governments.
9/ Using these sources is, unfortunately, the only option, but a lot of caution should be applied for obvious reasons. When it comes to π¨π³π·πΊ arms trade, other sources like publicly available shipping documents that include contract details are...well... rare to non-existent.
10/ The other question is: how much contracts like the deals described by @WSJ actually violate existing πΊπΈ export control regimes? In other words, how much πΊπΈ tech/IP etc. is in supply chain of products that π¨π³ companies supply to Putin's war machine?
11/ Finally, a policy question is: what do you do about transactions described by @WSJ? The most significant deals happen between π·πΊ&π¨π³ companies that are sanctioned by πΊπΈ years ago. There are some intermediary firms, but chasing them is like cutting Hydra's heads.
12/ Moreover, China and Russia share a border, they don't need to rely on global logistical hubs and shipping companies. Payments are also conducted trough RMB, as @amenka points out in this @CEIP_Politika piece. carnegieendowment.org
13/ Bottom line: Beijing is cautious, doesn't supply π·πΊ with finished arms, but πΊπΈ policies are unlikely to stop existing π¨π³π·πΊ mil-tech cooperation and π·πΊ mil exports to π¨π³. And, as π¨π³πΊπΈ relationship sours, there will be fewer incentives for π¨π³ to limit arms trade with π·πΊ. Π¨ΡΠΎΡ.
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