Oke so most likely gonna fade the boxFEE presale, obvs no. ETH raised is the effective no. fees needed to be accrued in order to be net profitable as a presaler (no oneβs gonna mint 1 boxETH:1boxFEE bc dilution/exit liq for presalers + permissionless boxFEE v3 LP)
π
π
At first glance this may seem unfeasible (1% of 5% stETH yield of 100m TVL = $50k fees), however imo (and objectively) the majority of protocol fees will ultimately come from resolve fees, albeit directly relative to user behavior in the system (LTV ratios, boxETH soft peg, etc)
In a nutshell, youβre essentially betting on users taking adv of the 0 IR/borrow fee thru selling debt boxETH (<1 ETH) whilst keeping loans as overcollat as possible (net incentive to do so given amped stETH yield on *only* the overcollat portion), given variable resolve fee
(Yea kinda contradicts itself bc LTVβ¬οΈ = more boxETH debt = smaller fee, tho ig it depends on the net size of a user x, given relative to boxETH amm price @ a given time t+1 (where time t = large user x wants free lvg & sells into LP), according to user xβs LTV (f(resolve fee))
So TLDR in the theoretical scenario that boxFEE presale raises 2k ETH @ an aggregate $1700/ETH, $3.4m in fee revs must be accrued in order to provide sufficient (net profitable) exit liq for presaloors (majority prob from resolve fees and/or altering % cut of stETH yield)
However, after the (potential) initial round of exit liq wen >.1 boxETH/boxFEE (3.4m fees), in the event that x no. boxFEE is redeemed, protocol revs in the form of backing will obvs be amplified per boxFEE ((1 - x no. redeemed)/fees)/boxFEE in circ, hence this β of game theory
now this tho, lol
Loading suggestions...