1/ The war in Ukraine has been a wake-up call for European countries, alerting them to the reality that defense matters.
After decades of relative peace and prosperity, the Russian-Ukrainian war has brought horrors back to Europe reminiscent of the continent's dark past.
After decades of relative peace and prosperity, the Russian-Ukrainian war has brought horrors back to Europe reminiscent of the continent's dark past.
2/ Moreover, the Kremlin's threats that it will do whatever it takes to win this war - indiscriminately killing civilians, attacking critical infrastructure, and threatening nuclear Armageddon - imply that the international order, including what was laboriously built up overβ¦
3/ β¦decades of arms control agreements and nonproliferation diplomacy, is at risk of being destroyed.
As German Chancellor Olaf Scholz said at the beginning of the war, the Russian invasion marks a Zeitenwende, a turning point in history.
edition.cnn.com
As German Chancellor Olaf Scholz said at the beginning of the war, the Russian invasion marks a Zeitenwende, a turning point in history.
edition.cnn.com
4/ In this case, the European security order showed signs of breaking down long before Russia invaded Ukraine in early 2022.
bundesregierung.de
bundesregierung.de
5/ They agreed that Europe had to take more responsibility for its security and defense, a call that was also heard from across the Atlantic, from gentle nudges from the Obama administrations to threats from President Donald Trump, who went so far as to question the U.S.β¦
6/ β¦security guarantee to Europe that forms the basis of NATO's collective defense.
theatlantic.com
theatlantic.com
8/ iai.it
9/ The few countries that were already serious about defense and had a strong strategic culture became even more so: France announced plans to increase its defense budget by 7.4 percent year on year, reaching the 2 percent GDP mark in 2023 rusi.org
10/ and the United Kingdom, already spending more than 2 percent, approved a trajectory that would see its defense budget rise to 3 percent of GDP defensenews.com
12/ Most significant is Germany`s announcement of an additional β¬100 billion in defense spending in 2022, bringing its defense budget to 1.6 percent of GDP and putting it on a trajectory to reach the 2 percent goal.
reuters.com
reuters.com
14/ The German Economic Institute reported that Berlin is not actually poised to hit the 2 percent target: The country is expected to be short β¬18 billion in 2023.
politico.eu
politico.eu
15/ Second, to the extent that new spending on defense is actually taking place, it will not necessarily strengthen Europe`s military capacity.
dw.com
dw.com
16/ France and Germany are buying helicopters and armored vehicles, while eastern European countries like Poland are massively investing in replacing the Soviet weapon systems that they have sent to Ukraine.
17/ Their military assistance to Ukraine is creating a national defense emergency in each country, which they are addressing by buying whatever is available.
18/ Other mini-lateral defense initiatives are emerging, such as the defense pacts between France and Greece or between the United Kingdom, Sweden, and Finland, which could eventually lead to the development of new European military capacities.
reuters.com
reuters.com
24/ The uptick in European defense spending is β perhaps inevitably β concentrated on the short term and thus is not spurring the long-term development of European defense capacities or the acquisition of European defense equipment.
25/ Third, insofar as Europe`s defense moment translates into greater spending on non-European defense capacities, the main malady of European defense β fragmentation β risks being exacerbated, with short-term uncoordinated national procurement decisions having long-termβ¦
26/ β¦impacts on the composition of the armed forces. Defense fragmentation is a major problem in Europe, with around 90 percent of investments spent on national defense industries.
27/ Furthermore, since the outbreak of the war in Ukraine, E.U. institutions have presented new initiatives on joint defense research and technological development to address the major European shortfalls and build a more competitive European defense industrial andβ¦
28/ β¦technological base. This is because these initiatives generally focus on the long-term development and procurement of European capacities. It is up to European countries β and them alone β to make major changes to their defense industries.
29/ Finally, turning from defense capacity to operations, the war has given NATO a vital new lease on life.
euronews.com
euronews.com
30/ If NATO is to remain the key operational locus for ensuring the defense of Europe, where does this leave European defense, that is E.U. defense initiatives?
31/ With NATO being primarily responsible for defense and deterrence in Europe β in no small part due to America`s nuclear umbrella, something that nuclear powers France and the United Kingdom could not replace β and having demonstrated its clear limits outside of Europe, theβ¦
32/ β¦future of E.U. defense could lie beyond the continent.
33/ In Africa, for instance, France has been forced to leave Mali and thus to significantly scale back its security presence in the Sahel, indicating that European countries are not stepping up and taking on more risk and responsibility in this part of the world.
34/ At the 2022 Madrid Summit, NATO leaders agreed on a New Force Model that would create a pool of 300,000 troops in a high state of readiness in Europe.
reuters.com
reuters.com
35/ Once Sweden and Finland enter the alliance, the growing overlap between E.U. and NATO membership β with 23 out of 27 E.U. member states being NATO allies β will strengthen further the logic of the European Union providing the incentives for a cohesive and effective Europeanβ¦
36/ pillar in NATO. egmontinstitute.be
37/ Furthermore, conventional and nuclear deterrence cannot be separated and, as mentioned above, it is the United States that provides Europe`s nuclear umbrella, with discussions about a Europeanization of France`s nuclear capabilities never having matured.
38/ Conclusion
Russia`s invasion of Ukraine has done more to wake up Europeans on the subject of defense in 11 months than have years of American cajoling about burden-sharing and European grand plans for strategic autonomy.
Russia`s invasion of Ukraine has done more to wake up Europeans on the subject of defense in 11 months than have years of American cajoling about burden-sharing and European grand plans for strategic autonomy.
39/ The war has shattered the foundations of European security, causing many European governments to finally start taking defense seriously.
40/ This has translated into some concrete action, most visibly regarding defense spending, military assistance to Ukraine, and NATO`s defense and deterrence.
41/ And yet, Europe`s defense moment is not necessarily strengthening European defense either in terms of industry or operational capacity.
42/ There is a serious risk that the opposite will occur in the form of a weakening of the European defense industrial and technological base and the reduction of European responsibility and risk-taking in their troubled neighborhood to the east and south.
43/ European strategic autonomy on defense remains an ever-distant chimera.
44/ In ten months, Europe`s gas dependence on Russia has plummeted from 40 percent to under 9 percent, with new supplies coming from Norway, Azerbaijan, Algeria, sub-Saharan African countries, the United States, and Qatar, as well as through a new drive on renewables.
45/ Painful as it is, the war in Ukraine is strengthening European strategic autonomy when it comes to energy. As with energy, the war has given rise to a European defense moment.
46/ But hardly anyone in Europe talks of European strategic autonomy in defense these days, largely because the topic had become so contentious in Washington.
47/ Defense remains firmly in national hands, and structural forces are not necessarily pushing European countries to work more together.
48/ European defense spending is not strengthening European military capacities and may even lead to greater fragmentation in the splintered European defense industrial sector.
49/ In the midst of war, Europeans are relying on the only defense organization that can operationally ensure their security, and that is NATO. The war in Ukraine has diverted America`s attention back to Europe.
50/ With the escalating tensions between Washington and an increasingly nationalistic Beijing, and the risk of war in Asia becoming more tangible by the day, the U.S. strategic predicament is ever clearer.
51/ The 2022 National Security Strategy indicates that America is focused primarily on China and then on Russia, and will not be able to fight two regional wars at the same time.
52/ It is therefore in America`s interest to ensure a strengthening of European defense so that it can focus more on its strategic priorities in Asia.
53/ Today, the increase in Europe`s demand for defense is not driving a parallel surge in European supply, but rather it is increasing European dependence on the United States.
54/ This does not bode well either for European or U.S. security and could add to the transatlantic tensions brewing over the Inflation Reduction Act.
reuters.com
reuters.com
55/ The European Union will never become primarily responsible for collective defense, but it can help develop full-spectrum forces that will enable European countries to contribute more to territorial defense in the context of NATO.
brookings.edu
brookings.edu
56/ Unless the European Union and the United States work together, European defense will not become a reality, to the detriment of both.
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