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Russian Invasion in Ukraine
In military operations, we often speak about ‘momentum’ and ‘seizing the initiative’. It is a term used in military publications, and heavily emphasised in #leadership & operations. Today, an examination of whether Russia is generating momentum in #Ukraine. 1/25 🧵
2/ The essence of seizing the initiative is gaining a position of advantage relative to an enemy & denying the enemy their objectives. Military leaders seek to disrupt enemy decision making, make their plans irrelevant &, force the enemy respond to friendly initiative.
3/ At the beginning of Russian invasion, the Russians seized the initiative. Despite the extraordinary courage of Ukraine’s defenders, Russian Army forces were able to seize over 20% of Ukraine and keep Ukraine on the defensive for the first six months of the war.
4/ From the middle of 2022, this began to change.
5/ In the east, the Ukrainians made the Russians pay dearly for every metre of ground gained. While the Russians may have seized Luhansk Oblast, they did so at enormous cost in humans and equipment that hardly justified the amount of territory gained.
6/ The exhaustion of Russian forces that resulted from this eastern campaign, and the introduction of the long-range strike capabilities of #HIMARS, saw initiative bleed away from the Russian Army. This set the scene for Ukrainian counter offensives in the south and the east.
7/ As Kofman & Lee have written, the Russian continuation of their eastern campaign, when the huge costs outweighed minor territorial gains, partially underpinned the September-November Ukrainian offensives. fpri.org
8/ In the wake of the Ukrainian successes in late 2022, the strategic and tactical initiative rested with #Ukraine. Even with the brutal Russian missile and drone campaign against Ukrainian civilians and infrastructure, Russia was unable to build any momentum in their operations.
9/ Ukraine appeared poised for additional offensive operations over winter, even if at a smaller scale than those of the preceding months. However, slow arrival of Western aid including artillery ammunition shortfalls probably precluded this.
10/ The large equipment & munitions commitments in December/January by NATO were probably a recognition that they may have missed a good opportunity to further weaken Russia at the end of 2022 and that they needed to ensure they did not make the same mistake in 2023.
11/ In January, Russian Surovikin, seen as too defensive, was replaced by Gerasimov. The Russians then began their 2023 offensive campaign. They attacked at multiple locations in eastern Ukraine and absorbed the Battle of Bakhmut into the larger Russian eastern offensive.
12/ So far, their campaign appears to have some operational unity (it is in the east), but there has been little imagination – or surprise – generated by Russian forces. They apply brute force, but gains have been marginal and their losses heavy (especially for eastern Russians).
13/ This graph from @war_mapper demonstrates just how marginal Russian gains have been so far in 2023. At the same time, the Ukrainian Armed Forces have fought hard and taken significant losses – although these appear to be significantly less than the Russians.
14/ Around #Vuhledar, multiple Russian assaults using mechanised, armoured and dismounted troops have founded on Ukrainian defences. This has destroyed some of the better remaining Russian combat brigades, but remains an ongoing battle.
15/ In Bakhmut, the Russians have thrown huge Wagner and Army resources into their attempt to seize the town. As I have written previously, the value of this small city does not justify this expense in lives, equipment and munitions. mickryan.substack.com
16/ Further north, Russian forces are continuing their attacks in the Kupyansk-Svatove-Kreminna direction, although these attacks have resulted in only minor gains.
17/ When an Army undertakes large scale operations like the Russian have over the past couple of months, they seek to generate momentum. This is physical, in that it requires movement, maneuver, battle and the capture of ground and destruction of their enemy.
18/ Momentum also has a psychological dimension. In conducting an offensive campaign, the Russians want to shape the perceptions of Ukrainian soldiers, Ukrainian government, journalists & Western governments to believe they have the capacity to attack for as long as it takes.
19/ So the Russians, having shaken off the defensive mindset that Surovikin imbued, are on the move again. They have generated some momentum in the past two months. But they have not yet seized the initiative strategically nor on the ground in the east.
20/ #Ukraine appears to be keeping its powder dry. Not only is it re-equipping and rearming with western donated arms, but it is also forming new units as well as stockpiling munitions and supplies for its forthcoming offensive operations.
21/ The timing & place of these offensive actions will be crucial for Ukraine. They will need to assess where tactical success is possible, but also where they might achieve a deep, operational level penetration to dislocate the Russian defensive scheme in an entire region.
22/ So, we will need to be patient to assess who has the initiative on the ground in the east. Only when the Ukrainians have launched their offensive, and the results of it are obvious, can such a judgement be made.
23/ Bakhmut may have some impact, but if Ukraine does cede ground in the east as a tactical realignment, it will not be the same as ‘Ukraine is losing the war’. Russia will want Western populations to believe this, but #Bakhmut is hardly a strategic centre in this war.
24/ In summary, we could observe that Russia has probably launched its offensive at a time that is disadvantageous for them, and this favours Ukraine. While much remains to be seen in the coming months, Gerasimov’s offensive may actually be rushing his Army to failure. End
25/ Thank you to the following for the links and images used in this thread: @DefenceHQ @War_mapper @TDF_UA @DefenceU @Palchyk_online @MaryanKushnir @RAlee85 @KofmanMichael
@igorlachenkov
@igorlachenkov
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