I keep coming back to the WWII revisionism debate because it strikes me as very revealing about the contemporary zeitgeist.
WWII is central to everyone's self-conception. The upshot message of this revisionism is that we can do anything - there aren't real tradeoffs. 1/
WWII is central to everyone's self-conception. The upshot message of this revisionism is that we can do anything - there aren't real tradeoffs. 1/
WWII is of course an historical event - almost 100 years ago. Yet it is of central importance to the narrative of essentially every important nation. It has an almost civic religious quality. So how it is interpreted is very significant. It can change how countries behave. 2/
Traditionally, the normal serious interpretation of the war was basically something like this:
- The Germans and to a lesser but serious degree the Japanese were exceptionally dangerous and capable foes.
- The Western powers swallowed their inhibitions and allied with a...3/
- The Germans and to a lesser but serious degree the Japanese were exceptionally dangerous and capable foes.
- The Western powers swallowed their inhibitions and allied with a...3/
loathsome Soviet government because it was necessary.
- All three big powers played important parts, but the primary victory mechanism was the Soviet struggle on the Eastern front, a titanic struggle of unprecedented brutality, suffering, and scale.
- America was an Arsenal 4/
- All three big powers played important parts, but the primary victory mechanism was the Soviet struggle on the Eastern front, a titanic struggle of unprecedented brutality, suffering, and scale.
- America was an Arsenal 4/
of allied victory. But American casualties were ~25x lower than those of the Soviets. Western Allied forces did not land in Germany until summer 1944, by which time the direction of battle on the Eastern Front was already clear. Indeed they did not do so because of their...5/
healthy fear of the German military.
- Germany was the Allies' - including Washington's - first priority. That said, the US dedicated a lot to the Pacific, partially because Fortress Europe was too dangerous, US forces needed time to train, Japan was more a naval war, etc. 6/
- Germany was the Allies' - including Washington's - first priority. That said, the US dedicated a lot to the Pacific, partially because Fortress Europe was too dangerous, US forces needed time to train, Japan was more a naval war, etc. 6/
The upshot of this history included:
- Sometimes you have to work with the loathsome for a higher good.
- Even with the world's largest industrial economy and dwarfing the Axis, the U.S. *still* prioritized.
- Respect your enemy's skill, even if you despise his cause. 7/
- Sometimes you have to work with the loathsome for a higher good.
- Even with the world's largest industrial economy and dwarfing the Axis, the U.S. *still* prioritized.
- Respect your enemy's skill, even if you despise his cause. 7/
The historical revisionism on the other hand (or at least the more extreme versions of it) appears (from what I can tell) to argue the following:
- The Western Allies won the war via industrial production and attriting Germany's war effort through the air war over Europe. 8/
- The Western Allies won the war via industrial production and attriting Germany's war effort through the air war over Europe. 8/
- The US didn't prioritize, equally fighting in the Pacific and Europe.
- Soviet losses were unnecessary, substantially due to USSR incompetence, etc. 9/
- Soviet losses were unnecessary, substantially due to USSR incompetence, etc. 9/
The upshot of this for today appear to include, based on observing how people interpret:
- Authoritarian militaries are poor.
- The US can do anything it sets its mind to. There's no real need to prioritize, to compromise, to lower goals below "global liberal hegemony." 10/
- Authoritarian militaries are poor.
- The US can do anything it sets its mind to. There's no real need to prioritize, to compromise, to lower goals below "global liberal hegemony." 10/
I am very confident that these lessons are *very* wrong and would be disastrous if used as a basis for policy today.
I am not an historian, but my take on the revisionism is: It adds some valuable nuance when properly proportioned, but taken to its extreme - as it often...11/
I am not an historian, but my take on the revisionism is: It adds some valuable nuance when properly proportioned, but taken to its extreme - as it often...11/
is on Twitter - it is incorrect, dangerous if turned into the lessons referred to above, and indeed I would say almost blasphemous in the classical sense of the word. 12/
It is facially absurd to argue that there is an equivalence between the unimaginable suffering of the Eastern Front and the provision of industrial production to the Soviet Union. Do we have Memorial and Veterans' Days for industrial workers? Of course not. That's not because 13/
we don't respect them. It's because we view laying down one's life for one's country or cause as "the ultimate sacrifice." Were Americans prepared to do that? We won't know but what's pretty clear is their leaders acted like they weren't. And the Soviets did it. That's fact. 14/
The battles at Stalingrad, Kursk, etc. broke the back of the German military. The Anglo-US air campaign helped but Germany didn't surrender because of the air war. It was stomped into submission by the Soviets destroying the Werhmacht and conquering Berlin, with some help 15/
from the Western Allies, particularly after summer 1944, when the Soviets were already in Poland.
Does that make the USSR good? No, obviously! It was an evil empire. *But that's the reality to grapple with.* 16/
Does that make the USSR good? No, obviously! It was an evil empire. *But that's the reality to grapple with.* 16/
Did the US act like it didn't need to make hard choices? Did it dismiss Germany?
Not at all. It had a Europe first policy, waited years to build up its forces for an attack on Fortress Europe, etc. And *that was when the US alone was a larger economy than all 3 Axis states. 17/
Not at all. It had a Europe first policy, waited years to build up its forces for an attack on Fortress Europe, etc. And *that was when the US alone was a larger economy than all 3 Axis states. 17/
Why do I say it's almost blasphemous to make this argument? Because I think it's really irreverent (in the literal sense) to make light of the enormous, bewildering sacrifice we deliberately leveraged to pursue the cause, and which allowed us to avoid such sacrifices. 18/
That doesn't mean liking the Stalin. Obviously. But it means a posture of honest recognition, of deep respect, of seriousness about that sacrifice and how we benefited from it. I think George Shultz offered an excellent model of it, recounted here. 19/
washingtonpost.com
washingtonpost.com
Land in Western Europe, I mean.
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