Alexander Gabuev 陳寒士
Alexander Gabuev 陳寒士

@AlexGabuev

16 Tweets 48 reads Apr 12, 2023
🇨🇳🇷🇺🧵
There’s a perception that Xi Jinping’s state visit to Moscow was little more than a show of public support for Putin, since no major new agreements were announced. That perception is wrong, I argue in my latest piece for @ForeignAffairs. 1/16 foreignaffairs.com
2/ The public outcome of the visit is the tip of the iceberg. The truly significant developments were concealed beneath the surface—or in this case, behind closed doors, in private negotiations between Putin, Xi and their teams.
3/ To determine the real agenda of the visit and understand why Beijing and Moscow would want to conceal it from the outside world, you have to read between the official statements.
4/ The Kremlin broke with its usual practice of publishing a list of those present at the talks, but footage, photos, and comments by Yuri Ushakov reveal that more than half of Putin’s team in the closed door talks were officials directly involved in Russia’s weapons programs.
5/ These officials, including @MedvedevRussiaE, Defense Ministry Sergei Shoigu, space agency head Yury Borisov, and federal service for military-technical cooperation head Dmitry Shugaev, were likely assembled to pursue one main goal: deepening defense cooperation with China.
6/ There is every reason to believe that 🇨🇳&🇷🇺used the March meeting to come to terms on important new defense agreements that they will not reveal until much later if at all—just as they have done in the past, eg over the sale of S-400 missile systems & Su-35 jets to China
7/ Just a decade ago, Moscow was reluctant to sell cutting-edge military technology to China for several reasons. But the deepening schism between Russia and the West after Crimea annexation changed that calculus. This piece from 2018 is still useful: foreignaffairs.com
8/ Now, following the complete breakdown of ties with the West, Moscow has little choice but to sell China its most advanced and precious technologies of interest to Beijing - most likely including designs (think of S-500, underwater platforms, fighter jet engines etc.)
9/ The presence in the Kremlin of Russian commodity producers' CEOs, like @RosneftEN's Igor Sechin, indicates that Xi and Putin also discussed expanding the sale of Russian natural resources to China.
10/ But Beijing has no interest in drawing attention to any of these deals to avoid accusations of funding the war against Ukraine. This explains why discussions on "Power of Siberia-2" gas pipeline were not mentioned by Chinese side at all.
11/ Beijing can afford to bide its time, since China’s leverage in these quiet discussions is growing: 🇨🇳 has many potential suppliers, including its traditional partners in the Middle East and elsewhere, whereas 🇷🇺 has few potential buyers (🇮🇳 option is useful, but tactical).
12/ 🇨🇳🇷🇺 relationship has become highly asymmetrical, but it is not one-sided. In this era of strategic competition between China and the US, Russia’s military technology, scientific talent & natural resources make it an indispensable partner for China.
13/ Russia also remains an anti-American great power with a permanent seat on the UN Security council: a convenient friend to have in a world where the US enjoys closer ties with dozens of countries in Europe and the Indo-Pacific and where China has few—if any—real friends.
14/ So although China wields great influence in the Kremlin, it does not exert control, similar to its relationship with North Korea: despite Pyongyang’s dependency on Beijing, China cannot fully control Kim Jong Un’s regime. economist.com
15/ Russia is also familiar with this kind of relationship, since it maintains a parallel one with Belarus, in which Moscow is the senior partner that can pressure, cajole, and coerce Minsk—but cannot dictate Belarusian policy across the board.
16/ In the years to come, Putin’s regime will have to learn the skill that junior partners the world over depend on for survival: how to manage upward. Штош. foreignaffairs.com

Loading suggestions...