🚨 𝗠𝗮𝗻 𝗖𝗶𝘁𝘆’𝘀 𝟭𝟭𝟱 𝗰𝗵𝗮𝗿𝗴𝗲𝘀: 𝗷𝘂𝘀𝘁 𝗵𝗼𝘄 𝘀𝗰𝗿𝗲𝘄𝗲𝗱 𝗮𝗿𝗲 𝘁𝗵𝗲𝘆? 💣💥
𝘈 𝘧𝘰𝘭𝘭𝘰𝘸 𝘶𝘱 𝘦𝘹𝘱𝘰𝘴𝘦́ 𝘪𝘯𝘵𝘰 𝘵𝘩𝘦 𝘦𝘷𝘪𝘥𝘦𝘯𝘤𝘦.
I received many comments on my previous thread analysing the evidence used by Uefa in its 2020 prosecution of Man City for breaches of Financial Fair Play (FFP), asking me to go into more detail about what other evidence exists and why things might be different this time around when Man City face an Independent Commission later this year for the 115 charges of breaching Premier League rules.
If you have not read this prior thread, I would suggest doing so before continuing as it offers vital context. You can find it here: x.com
If you are completely new to this topic and don’t know any of the background or what’s going on with it currently, I would suggest starting with this first thread where I cover the background behind the charges against Man City: x.com
In this new thread we’ll explore just how much trouble Man City is in by analysing publicly available evidence that underpins the Premier League’s 115 charges for breaching FFP rules.
There will be more evidence not in the public domain but the vast body of evidence that served as the catalyst for the 115 charges is available for all to see. I am referring to the Football Leaks documents produced by German publication Der Spiegel over the past 6 years, where they reveal emails hacked from Man City’s servers that outline a complex, covert operation to breach FFP on a massive scale with no-one finding out.
I will seek to breakdown the evidence and showcase how to it might be used to prosecute Man City.
𝙏𝙝𝙚 𝙘𝙤𝙣𝙩𝙚𝙭𝙩…
Der Spiegel has written several articles about the emails and how they outline the way Man City would covertly breach FFP by disguising injections of the owner’s money (equity) as legitimate sponsorship revenues; conspiring with the sponsors to funnel the owner’s money through the sponsors’ accounts. A download of the first large cache of email leaks can be found here: cdn.prod.www.spiegel.de
This makes up the bulk of the evidence that I analyse in this thread.
Man City revealed at the Court of Arbitration for Sport (CAS) that as many as 5.5 million documents had been obtained from the hack. As such, it’s possible there are more incriminating emails not yet released by Der Spiegel for public consumption. In the past, Der Spiegel has released new, unseen content in response to judgments and new revelations.
The 6 emails that Man City provided as originals during its CAS hearing against Uefa are just the tip of the iceberg when compared with the whole cache though. For reference, the CAS judgment and original copies of the 6 emails can be found here: tas-cas.org
What I will cover in this thread is to examine just how damaging the entire cache (released by Der Spiegel so far) could be to Man City at the Independent Commission (IC) empanelled by the Premier League to adjudicate on the 115 charges. This will build on the analysis I undertook in my previous thread, which examined 5/6 of the original emails provided by Man City.
And since whenever evidence against Man City surfaces, you will also find an ardent City fan immediately dismiss it with “CAS said we did nothing wrong”… I will also cover how it all fits in with what happened at CAS too.
The IC should commence soon and hopefully resolve the matter before summer next year.
𝘔𝘦𝘨𝘢 🧵 𝘸𝘢𝘳𝘯𝘪𝘯𝘨: 1-𝘩𝘰𝘶𝘳+ total 𝘳𝘦𝘢𝘥𝘪𝘯𝘨 𝘵𝘪𝘮𝘦!

🧵2/25
𝙏𝙝𝙚 𝙨𝙩𝙧𝙪𝙘𝙩𝙪𝙧𝙚 𝙤𝙛 𝙩𝙝𝙚 𝙩𝙝𝙧𝙚𝙖𝙙 𝙞𝙨 𝙖𝙨 𝙛𝙤𝙡𝙡𝙤𝙬𝙨…
𝗣𝗮𝗿𝘁 𝟭 - Will I even understand all this and why does it have to be so long? (post 3)
𝗣𝗮𝗿𝘁 𝟮 - Is the cache of leaked emails authentic and admissible as evidence? (posts 4)
𝗣𝗮𝗿𝘁 𝟯 - Why wasn’t the whole cache used as evidence at CAS? (post 5)
𝗣𝗮𝗿𝘁 𝟰 - Deep-dive analysis: What’s in the cache not already analysed in the previous thread? (posts 6-18)
𝗣𝗮𝗿𝘁 𝟱 - How damaging would the whole cache have been to Man City’s case had it been considered at CAS? (post 19)
𝗣𝗮𝗿𝘁 𝟲 - How damaging will the whole cache be to Man City at the upcoming Independent Commission? (post 20)
𝗣𝗮𝗿𝘁 𝟳 - Why are Man City execs acting so confidently? (post 21)
𝗣𝗮𝗿𝘁 𝟴 - Why are you so confident when many others are not? (post 22)
𝗣𝗮𝗿𝘁 𝟵 - What do you believe is a suitable sanction? (post 23)
𝗣𝗮𝗿𝘁 𝟭𝟬 - Is that it? (post 24)
Later this summer I will do a separate thread which focuses on how Man City escaped any significant penalty at CAS four years ago. However, in this thread, I will only cover the CAS hearing in a comparative manner, looking at how things should be different when compared with the IC, and the subsequent implications for the outcome.
As for this thread, it’s huge with a 1-hour+ total reading time (10,000 words and hundreds of emails / documents contained). If you decide you do want to read it, my advice would be to consume it in chunks, bookmarking the post that you get to before taking a break.
By the end, you should have a great sense of what Man City is facing though.
Vamos!

🧵3/25
𝗣𝗮𝗿𝘁 𝟭 - 𝗪𝗶𝗹𝗹 𝗜 𝗲𝘃𝗲𝗻 𝘂𝗻𝗱𝗲𝗿𝘀𝘁𝗮𝗻𝗱 𝗮𝗹𝗹 𝘁𝗵𝗶𝘀 𝗮𝗻𝗱 𝘄𝗵𝘆 𝗱𝗼𝗲𝘀 𝗶𝘁 𝗵𝗮𝘃𝗲 𝘁𝗼 𝗯𝗲 𝘀𝗼 𝗹𝗼𝗻𝗴?
The whole point of this thread is to make this topic understandable by everyone.
There are already numerous fantastic opinions and analyses on this matter, including Der Spiegel’s own articles of course.
However, with each one I have read, I have found at least one of three issues exist that, in my opinion, make it challenging for folks to truly appreciate everything they would need to in order to fully digest the situation and make their own informed conclusions about it:
The content/language is not simplified sufficiently to make it accessible; or
The author’s opinion is insufficiently substantiated with their underpinning factbase and logic in order to follow it from start to finish; or, most commonly,
The evidence is shared but not dissected, making it very difficult to link opinion back to the evidence.
I have sought to mitigate all 3 issues in this thread, writing it as clearly and coherently as I can, seeking to simplify some complex matters using accessible language. I have also tried to be as expansive as possible on my thinking to help others independently assess its worth and enable them to make their own informed conclusions. My hope is that everyone thinks about the matter critically.
My analysis is not perfect but it is the best I can do whilst trying to address the above. It’s also why it is do damn long. 🤷‍♂️
I am aware that there are respected commentators on this matter who hold different opinions to my own. I always welcome differing opinions and consider each one on its merit (so long as it has been sufficiently substantiated with fact and logic) and will even consider addendums to my posts when my thinking has been shifted as a result.
So, I’ll leave that there as an open invitation to anyone who is so inclined (best to do so in the comments of Part 10).

🧵4/25
𝗣𝗮𝗿𝘁 𝟮 - 𝗜𝘀 𝘁𝗵𝗲 𝗰𝗮𝗰𝗵𝗲 𝗼𝗳 𝗹𝗲𝗮𝗸𝗲𝗱 𝗲𝗺𝗮𝗶𝗹𝘀 𝗮𝘂𝘁𝗵𝗲𝗻𝘁𝗶𝗰 𝗮𝗻𝗱 𝗮𝗱𝗺𝗶𝘀𝘀𝗶𝗯𝗹𝗲 𝗮𝘀 𝗲𝘃𝗶𝗱𝗲𝗻𝗰𝗲?
The short answer is, almost certainly. Here’s the long version…
𝘼𝙪𝙩𝙝𝙚𝙣𝙩𝙞𝙘𝙞𝙩𝙮 - 𝙖𝙧𝙚 𝙩𝙝𝙚𝙮 𝙜𝙚𝙣𝙪𝙞𝙣𝙚?
Man City has always refused to acknowledge the authenticity of the Der Spiegel Football Leaks emails.
Their assertion is that because they were criminally obtained, they are not required to verify them. The majority of the CAS panel decided not to challenge Man City in this assertion because it made a finding that:
“𝘔𝘳 𝘞𝘪𝘥𝘥𝘰𝘸𝘴𝘰𝘯 [𝘔𝘢𝘯 𝘊𝘪𝘵𝘺’𝘴 𝘏𝘦𝘢𝘥 𝘰𝘧 𝘍𝘪𝘯𝘢𝘯𝘤𝘦] 𝘢𝘯𝘥 𝘔𝘳 𝘗𝘦𝘢𝘳𝘤𝘦 [𝘢 𝘋𝘪𝘳𝘦𝘤𝘵𝘰𝘳 𝘰𝘧 𝘔𝘢𝘯 𝘊𝘪𝘵𝘺] 𝘢𝘤𝘬𝘯𝘰𝘸𝘭𝘦𝘥𝘨𝘦𝘥 𝘵𝘩𝘦 𝘷𝘦𝘳𝘢𝘤𝘪𝘵𝘺 𝘰𝘧 𝘵𝘩𝘦 𝘓𝘦𝘢𝘬𝘦𝘥 𝘌𝘮𝘢𝘪𝘭𝘴 𝘣𝘺 𝘵𝘩𝘦𝘪𝘳 𝘵𝘦𝘴𝘵𝘪𝘮𝘰𝘯𝘪𝘦𝘴. 𝘔𝘳 𝘞𝘪𝘥𝘥𝘰𝘸𝘴𝘰𝘯 𝘦𝘹𝘱𝘭𝘪𝘤𝘪𝘵𝘭𝘺 𝘥𝘪𝘥 𝘴𝘰.”
This can be found in paragraph (para.) 86 of the CAS judgment (photo attached).
As such, CAS decided that Man City had, in fact, verified the Leaked Emails brought before CAS by Uefa (albeit inadvertently it would seem).
Now, some people try to assert that the emails released by Der Spiegel were “doctored”. There is no accusation of this by Man City before CAS. Such an accusation is unfounded. I can only assume this lie has originated as a result of mis-reading para. 84 in the CAS judgment (photo attached).
This paragraph would only give people a false impression of the emails being doctored if they did not read it to the end where it clearly says “𝘵𝘩𝘦 𝘗𝘢𝘯𝘦𝘭 𝘧𝘪𝘯𝘥𝘴 𝘵𝘩𝘢𝘵 𝙞𝙩 𝙙𝙞𝙙 𝙣𝙤𝙩 𝙖𝙛𝙛𝙚𝙘𝙩 𝙩𝙝𝙚 𝙫𝙚𝙧𝙖𝙘𝙞𝙩𝙮 𝙤𝙛 𝙩𝙝𝙚 𝙇𝙚𝙖𝙠𝙚𝙙 𝙀𝙢𝙖𝙞𝙡𝙨 𝘰𝘯 𝘸𝘩𝘪𝘤𝘩 𝘜𝘦𝘧𝘢 𝘱𝘳𝘪𝘮𝘢𝘳𝘪𝘭𝘺 𝘣𝘢𝘴𝘦𝘥 𝘪𝘵𝘴 𝘤𝘢𝘴𝘦”.
If you line up the originals provided by Man City with the leaked versions from Der Spiegel - their contents match perfectly with only some immaterial exceptions:
The time on emails differ by one hour - I would assume this is because the hacked emails were printed out in a country with a one-hour time difference to Man City’s server
Some information is redacted (blacked out) such as full email addresses or names - I assume by Der Spiegel to protect individual privacy rights
Long email signatures are not always fully included (e.g., graphics with the club logo)
The emails were not doctored - there is no substantive difference in any of the content. If you want to look for yourself, I have provided the necessary links in the first post so you can do so.
Specifically with regards to Leaked Email 4 which Man City asserts was in fact two separate emails merged together, this is impossible to verify because the version that Man City provided was too heavily redacted. Even so, CAS confirms that the veracity is not in question. So again, no doctoring.
There is no evidence of doctoring and not even any accusation that anything was doctored by Man City. To suggest otherwise is folly.
𝘼𝙙𝙢𝙞𝙨𝙨i𝙗𝙞𝙡𝙞𝙩𝙮 - 𝙘𝙖𝙣 𝙩𝙝𝙚𝙮 𝙗𝙚 𝙪𝙨𝙚𝙙 𝙖𝙨 𝙚𝙫𝙞𝙙𝙚𝙣𝙘𝙚?
First, let’s touch on their prior admissibility at CAS.
Man City tried to assert during prior proceedings that the Leaked Emails (and subsequently, the originals supplied) should not be admissible as evidence because they were originally obtained through criminal means. CAS disagreed and admitted the emails provided by Man City as evidence for the proceeding.
The emails were deemed admissible.
As it happens, even though the 6 emails were admitted, there is also reason to believe that CAS may not have actually weighed 3 of the 6 emails as evidence when forming judgment. This is due to what CAS writes in para. 297 of the judgment where it outlines that evidence arising from investigation into time-barred matters constitutes “𝘧𝘳𝘶𝘪𝘵 𝘧𝘳𝘰𝘮 𝘢 𝘱𝘰𝘪𝘴𝘰𝘯𝘰𝘶𝘴 𝘵𝘳𝘦𝘦 𝘢𝘯𝘥 𝘵𝘩𝘦 𝘮𝘢𝘫𝘰𝘳𝘪𝘵𝘺 𝘰𝘧 𝘵𝘩𝘦 𝘱𝘢𝘯𝘦𝘭 𝘧𝘪𝘯𝘥𝘴 𝘔𝘊𝘍𝘊 𝘤𝘢𝘯𝘯𝘰𝘵 𝘣𝘦 𝘴𝘢𝘯𝘤𝘵𝘪𝘰𝘯𝘦𝘥 𝘰𝘯 𝘵𝘩𝘪𝘴 𝘣𝘢𝘴𝘪𝘴".
Fruit from the poisonous tree is a term you may have heard before because it is common in US legal dramas and film. It establishes that evidence obtained illegally and in violation of the affected party’s lawful rights cannot be used against them as evidence. If you poison the tree - you can’t eat the fruit.
This statement was made in reference to CAS determining that some of the charges for alleged offences were time-barred and therefore, they decided to exclude evidence that arose from specifically investigating those time-barred offences. The paragraph refers to alleged falsified statements provided by Man City that were not weighed as evidence as a result. However, in the judgment, CAS is not specific with precisely which evidence it weighed and did not weigh for its judgement.
In paras. 213-229, CAS outlines the evidentiary value of the Leaked Emails. However, this commentary is not explicit regarding which contents were weighed and the first 3 emails relate exclusively to offences that occurred in the time-barred period.
There was crucial evidence in the first 3 emails (that CAS failed to even highlight in its commentary when assessing the evidentiary value, which is alarming). Excluding them would have been detrimental to Uefa’s case.
(As an aside, if the first 3 emails were indeed weighed as evidence then this lends itself to some inconsistent findings made by the majority of the CAS panel that I will surface in a subsequent thread about the CAS decision. This is why I believe they must have been excluded. If not, there are alarming inconsistencies between their findings and the evidence.)
So in all, I believe only 3 emails may have actually been admitted 𝗮𝗻𝗱 weighed as evidence at CAS.
Now, for the likely admissibility of the Leaked Email cache at the Independent Commission (IC)…
Nothing will be excluded as “𝘧𝘳𝘶𝘪𝘵 𝘧𝘳𝘰𝘮 𝘵𝘩𝘦 𝘱𝘰𝘪𝘴𝘰𝘯𝘰𝘶𝘴 𝘵𝘳𝘦𝘦”. For one, English Law has no such provision. Only unreliable evidence can be excluded - not evidence obtained in violation of rights.
It is also highly unlikely that any charges will be time-barred. CAS found certain offences to be time-barred because Uefa itself had an explicit provision within its rules time-barring offences that occurred 5 years prior to prosecution.
The Premier League has no such provision. The IC will operate under English Law which does have a statute of limitations (time-barring old offences) but it is highly unlikely
to be applied here.
The statute of limitations for civil offences prohibits ‘action’ (equivilent of prosecution) more than 6 years after the offence occurred (12 years if it’s related to a speciality contract which may be the case here). However, the clock doesn’t counting down until such offences could reasonably become known to the Premier League. Given the charges are based entirely on Man City hiding their offences, this would not have been feasible until the emails were leaked. As such, we are well within any applicable time limit.
So it seems extremely unlikely that English Law statute of limitations would have any bearing on the charges or affiliated evidence, like it was at CAS.
To use the whole cache as evidence, or at least the section linked above, the Premier League’s legal team would need Man City to either acknowledge its authenticity or reproduce the original copies. As I understand it, this was a key matter of the legal battle between Man City and the Premier League in the English Courts of Law that Man City eventually lost but which contributed to the significant delays in empanelling the IC.
So, whereas I believe only 3 of the emails may have been weighed as evidence at CAS, I have no reason to doubt that the whole cache will form part of the evidence base at the IC and I have seen no plausible reason ever provided to hold such doubt.
The resulting difference in scale and value of the body of evidence available is stark.

🧵5/25
𝗣𝗮𝗿𝘁 𝟯 - 𝗪𝗵𝘆 𝘄𝗮𝘀𝗻’𝘁 𝘁𝗵𝗲 𝘄𝗵𝗼𝗹𝗲 𝗰𝗮𝗰𝗵𝗲 𝘂𝘀𝗲𝗱 𝗮𝘀 𝗲𝘃𝗶𝗱𝗲𝗻𝗰𝗲 𝗮𝘁 𝗖𝗔𝗦?
The short answer is that Uefa screwed up, big time.
𝙃𝙤𝙬 𝙙𝙞𝙙 𝙐𝙚𝙛𝙖 𝙨𝙘𝙧𝙚𝙬 𝙪𝙥 𝙨𝙤 𝙗𝙖𝙙𝙡𝙮?
During the proceedings between Uefa and Man City (prior to the CAS appeal), Man City had effectively refused to engage with the investigation or provide requested evidence. The result was Uefa convicting them of the charges that Man City then sought to overturn at CAS.
For the CAS hearing, Uefa requested that CAS order Man City to provide the “𝘤𝘰𝘮𝘱𝘭𝘦𝘵𝘦 𝘢𝘯𝘥 𝘶𝘯𝘳𝘦𝘥𝘢𝘤𝘵𝘦𝘥 𝘳𝘶𝘯𝘴 𝘰𝘧 𝘦𝘮𝘢𝘪𝘭𝘴” and not just the 6 emails that Uefa based its initial case on (Man City did provide those 6 emails as originals at CAS).
This can be seen in para. 40 of the CAS judgment (photo attached).
The “run” refers to sequences of emails connected with the same events in the case that can be found (at least partially) in the Der Spiegel cache of leaked emails linked in the first post of the thread.
Incredibly, Man City refused to comply with this! They refused to produce the entire run of unredacted emails.
And this is where Uefa royally screwed up… reading paras. 309-314 of the CAS judgment, para. 311 in particular, it becomes clear that after Man City refused to comply, Uefa then dropped their demand for Man City to produce the entire run of unredacted emails. They advised CAS that they no longer deemed them necessary.
As a result, the majority of the CAS panel determined that no adverse inferences could be drawn from Man City’s refusal to comply and no sanction was applied as a result.
If Uefa had not dropped its demand and Man City continued to refuse production of the emails, I cannot see a world where a reasonable, impartial adjudicator would not read adverse inferences to the point Man City’s case at CAS would have been crushed.
This was an absolutely major screw up by Uefa - pure and simple.
𝙎𝙤 𝙬𝙝𝙮 𝙙𝙞𝙙 𝙐𝙚𝙛𝙖 𝙨𝙘𝙧𝙚𝙬 𝙪𝙥 𝙨𝙤 𝙗𝙖𝙙𝙡𝙮?
First off, I’d advise you to kill off any thoughts of conspiracy in your head if you have them.
Uefa is not one person - it’s like any major organisation, full of politics and people with competing agendas. Collusion is highly implausible and inconsistent with how events actually unfolded from start to finish. Collusion or conspiracy would have taken a very different approach.
So why do I believe Uefa screwed up this badly? Two reasons:
Pressure to resolve the matter rapidly to the point of it being expedient, so that this scandal did not hang over Uefa’s upcoming Champions League tournament
Over-confidence in their case resulting from lack of competence
In para. 311 of the judgment (snippet attached), you can see that Uefa wrote to CAS and made clear both of their desire to get the matter resolved quickly and of their confidence that the 6 emails provided would be sufficient for CAS to dismiss Man City’s appeal.
In addition, other surprising decisions made by Uefa appear to reinforce the theory that they had a strong preference for expediency:
Uefa accepted Man City’s suggestion for who should serve as the President on the CAS Panel (not normal protocol) instead of rejecting it and pushing for CAS to nominate someone in an entirely independently way from the parties (normal protocol).
Uefa chose not to appeal the CAS decision despite having strong grounds upon which to do so.
It feels like they just wanted it over and done with and preferred the outcome they got versus a world where it dragged on in order to get to the right outcome.
As for the over-confidence in their case, I can understand this to be honest. The emails are there, in black and white, outlining precisely how Man City was seeking to subvert FFP, written in their own words. They read like a confession. How could CAS not side with them?
Their incompetence, possibly due to a lack of experience, meant they failed to anticipate the means by which Man City would defend itself and also, how CAS might apply the standard of proof that it did.
Could having the whole cache admitted as evidence have helped them overcome these challenges? We’ll never know. And none of this is to say I don’t find the majority decision by the CAS panel on this matter to be egregious - I do. There are multiple reasons behind this, which is something I will cover in another thread in future.
However, Uefa’s expediency and over-confidence cost them an arsenal’s worth of vital ammunition for this battle that they should have had available to them and which, potentially, could have made the difference.

🧵6/25
𝗣𝗮𝗿𝘁 𝟰 - 𝗗𝗲𝗲𝗽-𝗱𝗶𝘃𝗲 𝗮𝗻𝗮𝗹𝘆𝘀𝗶𝘀: 𝗪𝗵𝗮𝘁’𝘀 𝗶𝗻 𝘁𝗵𝗲 𝗰𝗮𝗰𝗵𝗲 𝗻𝗼𝘁 𝗮𝗹𝗿𝗲𝗮𝗱𝘆 𝗮𝗻𝗮𝗹𝘆𝘀𝗲𝗱 𝗶𝗻 𝘁𝗵𝗲 𝗽𝗿𝗲𝘃𝗶𝗼𝘂𝘀 𝘁𝗵𝗿𝗲𝗮𝗱?
So much…
More emails going into more detail about how they were covertly breaching FFP
More context demonstrating how the different parties were involved
Lots more detail in the form of attachments such as powerpoint slides with tables and charts containing damning financial detail
Emails 𝗳𝗿𝗼𝗺 the key figure in the case, Simon Pearce, acknowledging the described arrangements taking place (in the 6 originals supplied by Man City at CAS, only one email is from Pearce and it was almost entirely redacted)
Emails demonstrating de facto state ownership of Man City and improper relationships with sponsors as a result
As such, there is a lot that the entire cache adds to the bigger picture and it makes for a far more damning case.
I won’t produce and analyse every single email or slide here - only the ones I feel are most relevant and easily understood, which is the majority as it happens! However, if you choose to, you can review all of them yourself in the link I provided in the first post.
This time round, rather than add all quotes directly from the emails into the posts and explain what they mean sentence by sentence; the way I have analysed the emails/documents is to group photos of them in sequence as a run of emails, then comment in the photo on what any pertinent contents mean (in simplified terms). I also provide an overall summary for each run and its implications to both the IC and what happened at CAS inside the post, as well as identify when a run connects to an “original” email that I analysed in my previous thread.
Now, let’s dig in…

🧵7/25
𝗘𝗺𝗮𝗶𝗹 𝗮𝗻𝗱 𝗮𝘁𝘁𝗮𝗰𝗵𝗺𝗲𝗻𝘁 (𝗶) - 𝟮𝟳 𝗠𝗮𝘆 𝟮𝟬𝟭𝟮
This is an email with a slide deck attachment sent from Graham Wallace (Man City’s Chief Operating Officer) to Simon Pearce (a Director of Man City’s board, a senior figure in the UAE Govt and a key advisor to both the ruler of the UAE and Man City’s Chairman) CCing John MacBeath (Man City’s interim CEO).
The email and its attachment were not used at the CAS hearing.
In the email, Wallace tells Pearce that Man City has some cash needs and asks him to facilitate cash from both the owner and sponsors. This demonstrates a controversial situation around governance / controls, where Simon Pearce is being asked to pay monies, supposedly from sponsors, on their behalf. This should not be happening.
In the attached document, there is a slide deck showcasing all of the investment made by the owner of Man City up to May 2012, with a forecast for the subsequent 3 years. This document shows that Man City disguised equity funding as sponsorship revenues from Abu Dhabi partners to the tune of £149.5m over 2010/11 and 2011/12 and then projected to do the same going forward to the tune of £62.5m a year over the next 3 years.
This would be equivalent to fraudulently reporting £337m of funds over 5 years and a breach to FFP rules of £257m (2010/11 is excluded for the FFP calculation because FFP only came into force in 2011/12).
The relevance of this email and attachment is not only does it show a plan to covertly breach FFP to an enormous degree, but it also asserts that this has already taken place.
CAS said there was no proof that any of the arrangements discussed in the emails they saw actually took place - this is a piece of evidence of such an action.
It is a significant piece of evidence for use at the IC.

🧵8/25
𝗘𝗺𝗮𝗶𝗹 𝗿𝘂𝗻 (𝗶𝗶) - 𝟱-𝟲 𝗦𝗲𝗽𝘁𝗲𝗺𝗯𝗲𝗿 𝟮𝟬𝟭𝟮
This is an email run involving: Graham Wallace (Man City’s Chief Operating Officer), Simon Pearce (a Director of Man City’s board, a senior figure in the UAE Govt and a key advisor to both the ruler of the UAE and Man City’s Chairman) and sometimes CCing Ferran Soriano (Man City’s CEO).
This email run relates to Email A analysed in my prior thread, found here: x.com
None of the run, except for Email A, was used at the CAS hearing.
The email run starts with en email from Wallace to Pearce, informing him that there is an urgent need for cash. The run concludes with Email A, in which Wallace makes it crystal clear that equity is to be disguised as sponsorship income by channelling it through the sponsors’ accounts.
Email A was already very damning, as I explained in the analysis contained in the prior thread.
However, having the entire run available amplifies its significance. In the email on 5 September 2012 at 9.38PM, Wallace asks Pearce to route cash to Man City via different bank accounts so it can be identified with different partner arrangements. The key bit is Pearce’s response of “𝘱𝘦𝘳𝘧𝘦𝘤𝘵 - 𝘴𝘵𝘢𝘯𝘥𝘪𝘯𝘨 𝘣𝘺”.
Although this does not serve to show Pearce actually followed through - it shows he was standing by to. Something that appears to contradict the synthesis of his testimony provided in the CAS judgment.

🧵9/25
𝗘𝗺𝗮𝗶𝗹 𝗿𝘂𝗻 (𝗶𝗶𝗶) - 𝟳 𝗗𝗲𝗰𝗲𝗺𝗯𝗲𝗿 𝟮𝟬𝟭𝟮 - 𝟭𝟰 𝗝𝗮𝗻𝘂𝗮𝗿𝘆 𝟮𝟬𝟭𝟯
This is an email run involving: Andrew Widdowson (Man City’s Head of Finance), Simon Pearce (a Director of Man City’s board, a senior figure in the UAE Govt and a key advisor to both the ruler of the UAE and Man City’s Chairman) and sometimes CCing Jorge Chumillas (Man City’s CFO) and Graham Wallace (Man City’s COO).
It also involves the Senior Manager Sponsorship at Etihad and a Finance Executive - Brand & Commercial at Man City. Their names have been redacted by Der Spiegel for individual privacy reasons.
This email run relates to Email B analysed in my prior thread, found here: x.com
None of the run, except for Email B, was used at the CAS hearing.
Email B makes up the first email in the run. In it, Widdowson is asking Simon Pearce to help channel shareholder (owner) funds through Abu Dhabi partners (Etisalat and Etihad), thereby subverting FFP. He also admits that this has already been done before, in previous quarters - an admission that the arrangements have been enacted already.
The run then goes on to show that Pearce confirms he will expedite the plan, followed by confirmation from someone at Eithad that the funds have been transferred into their bank accounts (and is burning a hole in their wallet) and that they need the invoice from Man City to transfer it on. Pearce confirms he is helping to facilitate the entire arrangement for Widdowson.
The significance of having the whole email run is to show not only was the arrangement to subvert FFP requested, but that it was also put into action. Again, more evidence to demonstrate the arrangements had been put into action, which CAS found to be missing within the limited evidence it reviewed.

🧵10/25
𝗘𝗺𝗮𝗶𝗹 𝗿𝘂𝗻 (𝗶𝘃) - 𝟭𝟳-𝟮𝟭 𝗝𝗮𝗻𝘂𝗮𝗿𝘆 𝟮𝟬𝟭𝟯
This is an email run involving: Andrew Widdowson (Man City’s Head of Finance), Simon Cliff (Man City’s General Legal Counsel), Ali Alfrayhat and Omar Awad (members of EAA - the Executive Affairs Authority, a special Govt agency for the ruler of UAE).
None of this email run was used at the CAS hearing.
The run begins with Cliff providing a summary of owner funding into Man City, to a member of UAE’s Govt, Alfrayhat. Alfrayhat asks for confirmation that all amounts listed have been registered in Man City’s books as “𝘤𝘢𝘱𝘪𝘵𝘢𝘭 𝘤𝘰𝘯𝘵𝘳𝘪𝘣𝘶𝘵𝘪𝘰𝘯” (i.e., equity), which we know from other emails has not been the case. Equity has been registered as sponsorship income to subvert FFP.
This is where Widdowson steps in to make clear that for this kind of analysis, the “𝘱𝘢𝘳𝘵𝘯𝘦𝘳 𝘴𝘶𝘱𝘱𝘭𝘦𝘮𝘦𝘯𝘵” (i.e., the equity being disguised as sponsorship income) must not be shown if it is “𝘨𝘰𝘪𝘯𝘨 𝘰𝘶𝘵𝘴𝘪𝘥𝘦 𝘰𝘧 𝘵𝘩𝘦 𝘤𝘭𝘶𝘣”.
Cliff acknowledges this and expresses a hope that they “𝘩𝘢𝘷𝘦 𝘦𝘹𝘤𝘭𝘶𝘥𝘦𝘥 𝘵𝘩𝘦 𝘴𝘱𝘰𝘯𝘴𝘰𝘳 𝘧𝘶𝘯𝘥𝘪𝘯𝘨 𝘧𝘳𝘰𝘮 𝘵𝘩𝘦 𝘢𝘤𝘤𝘰𝘶𝘯𝘵𝘴”.
The significance of this email run is to show that knowledge about the arrangements extended beyond just Man City and to members of the UAE Govt. too. In the CAS Panel’s decision, they note the relevance of all the emails they saw staying ‘in house’, meaning it was less likely arrangements were known and executed externally.
It also shows that not only are the arrangements well known across the Man City hierarchy but that many of the execs will go to lengths to ensure it is kept hidden from outside view.
As an aside, this also provides evidence that Man City is indeed a de facto state-owned club. Officials from the UAE Govt. who report into its ruler (the function of the EEA) taking responsibility for preparing schedules of owner funding into Man City - if Man City was actually just a private asset of Mansour’s, this would not be happening.

🧵11/25
𝗘𝗺𝗮𝗶𝗹 𝗮𝗻𝗱 𝗮𝘁𝘁𝗮𝗰𝗵𝗺𝗲𝗻𝘁 (𝘃) - 𝟮𝟮 𝗠𝗮𝘆 𝟮𝟬𝟭𝟯
This is an email with a slide deck attachment sent from Simon Pearce (a Director of Man City’s board, a senior figure in the UAE Govt and a key advisor to both the ruler of the UAE and Man City’s Chairman) to Jorge Chumillas (Man City’s CFO) CCing Ferran Soriano (Man City’s CEO).
The email and its attachment were not used at the CAS hearing.
In the email, Pearce is asking Chumillas to produce an updated table with ADUG commitments for 2013/14. i.e., funds required from the owner for season 2013/14.
He asks for it split into sections including “𝘊𝘭𝘶𝘣 𝘥𝘪𝘳𝘦𝘤𝘵 𝘱𝘢𝘺𝘮𝘦𝘯𝘵𝘴” (i.e., regular equity injections into Man City) and “𝘗𝘢𝘳𝘵𝘯𝘦𝘳 𝘴𝘶𝘱𝘱𝘭𝘦𝘮𝘦𝘯𝘵𝘴” (i.e., the equity that Man City is disguising by channelling it through its partners).
This is supported by the numbers in the table which has a section labelled “𝘍𝘶𝘯𝘥𝘪𝘯𝘨 𝘷𝘪𝘢 𝘈𝘣𝘶 𝘋𝘩𝘢𝘣𝘪 𝘗𝘢𝘳𝘵𝘯𝘦𝘳𝘴”, listing out amounts to come from all of the sponsors including Etihad, AABAR, ADTA, Etisalat, equating to £92.5m total. The header for the table is “𝘈𝘋𝘜𝘎 𝘊𝘢𝘴𝘩 𝘙𝘦𝘲𝘶𝘪𝘳𝘦𝘮𝘦𝘯𝘵𝘴 - 2013/14”.
This is detailing the cash required by the owner, to be channelled through the sponsors, thereby the disguising equity sponsorship revenues.
The significance of this email is that it is 𝗳𝗿𝗼𝗺 Simon Pearce. At CAS, there were no emails from Simon Pearce except for one that was very heavily redacted. As such, Uefa had nothing to challenge his testimony with.
The other relevance of this attachment is it shows that disguised equity funding reached £92.5m in 2013/14, potentially making Uefa’s original estimate of how much extra money Man City wrongfully pumped into the club, an under-estimate. The actual figure could be much higher.

🧵12/25
𝗘𝗺𝗮𝗶𝗹 𝗿𝘂𝗻 (𝘃𝗶) - 𝟵 𝗗𝗲𝗰𝗲𝗺𝗯𝗲𝗿 𝟮𝟬𝟭𝟯 - 𝟵 𝗝𝗮𝗻𝘂𝗮𝗿𝘆 𝟮𝟬𝟭𝟰
This is an email run involving: Andrew Widdowson (Man City’s Head of Finance), Simon Pearce (a Director of Man City’s board, a senior figure in the UAE Govt and a key advisor to both the ruler of the UAE and Man City’s Chairman), Jorge Chumillas (Man City’s CFO) and sometimes CCing Ferran Soriano (Man City’s CEO).
It also involves Peter Baumgartner (Chief Commercial Officer of Etihad) - this is key.
This email run relates to Email D analysed in my prior thread, found here: x.com
None of the run, except for Email D, was used at the CAS hearing.
This run of emails starts with a concern over short term cash flow and the recognition that monies are still required from Etihad. Widdowson informs Chumillas of the cash flow issue, who then asks Pearce for clarity on when money is coming from Etihad.
Pearce confirms it will be there soon but asks for clarity on how the amount requested has been calculated.
Chumillas works through this with Widdowson and supplies Pearce with the details (Email D). In this email, Chumillas explains that Man City still requires £57m from its £65m sponsorship contract, explaining that Etihad pays £8m of the £65m, whilst the rest is ADUG contribution (owner funds).
Pearce clarifies a few matters before sending on the request to Peter Baumgartner, CCO of Etihad - Man City’s key sponsor. In that email, Pearce makes clear that he has been “𝘶𝘯𝘥𝘦𝘳𝘱𝘢𝘺𝘪𝘯𝘨” Etihad rather than “𝘰𝘷𝘦𝘳𝘱𝘢𝘺𝘪𝘯𝘨” them. There is no reason that Pearce should be paying anything into Etihad. It’s Man City’s sponsor and should not be funded at all by ADUG. But it is. Pearce even writes “𝘴𝘰 𝘸𝘦 𝘴𝘩𝘰𝘶𝘭𝘥 𝘣𝘦 𝘳𝘦𝘤𝘦𝘪𝘷𝘪𝘯𝘨 𝘢 𝘵𝘰𝘵𝘢𝘭 𝘰𝘧 £99𝘮 – 𝘰𝘧 𝘸𝘩𝘪𝘤𝘩 𝘺𝘰𝘶 𝘸𝘪𝘭𝘭 𝘱𝘳𝘰𝘷𝘪𝘥𝘦 £8𝘮”. This is Pearce confirming with Etihad the plan for them to pay the sponsorship contract in full, but only £8m of it will actually come from them. ADUG funds the rest.
This is evidence of the arrangements being fulfilled. Monies being transferred to the sponsor. Pearce offers to do it again in some options at the end of the email.
The rest of the run confirms receipt of the payment.
This run is by far the most damaging piece of evidence in the entire cache. Not only does it explicitly set out the arrangements for disguising equity as sponsorship income (in Email D that CAS admitted), but it also then shows the communication between Pearce and the sponsor confirming a transfer of funds from ADUG to Etihad and then, evidences receipt of payment into Man City.
It showcases the plan being put into action from start to finish.
This is a devastating piece of evidence and would have turned upside down a number of key witness testimonies at CAS as well as some of the Panel’s key findings.
I can only imagine what the Uefa legal team must have been thinking and feeling as Man City’s witnesses declared, under oath, that they had not undertaken such arrangements; knowing full well what was said in these emails but unable to produce them to impeach. They must have felt so foolish for dropping the demand that the whole run of emails be provided by Man City.

🧵13/25
𝗘𝗺𝗮𝗶𝗹 𝗿𝘂𝗻 (𝘃𝗶𝗶) - 𝟮𝟮-𝟮𝟱 𝗝𝗮𝗻𝘂𝗮𝗿𝘆 𝟮𝟬𝟭𝟰
This is an email run involving: Simon Pearce (a Director of Man City’s board, a senior figure in the UAE Govt and a key advisor to both the ruler of the UAE and Man City’s Chairman), Omar Awad (a member of EAA - the Executive Affairs Authority, a special Govt agency for the ruler of UAE), and Ferran Soriano (Man City’s CEO).
None of this email run was used at the CAS hearing.
The run is about getting corporate hospitality tickets to Awad, who “𝘸𝘰𝘳𝘬𝘴 𝘧𝘰𝘳 𝘵𝘩𝘦 𝘌𝘈𝘈 𝘢𝘯𝘥 𝘪𝘴 𝘷𝘦𝘳𝘺 𝘪𝘮𝘱𝘰𝘳𝘵𝘢𝘯𝘵 𝘢𝘯𝘥 𝘩𝘦𝘭𝘱𝘧𝘶𝘭 𝘪𝘯 𝘧𝘢𝘤𝘪𝘭𝘪𝘵𝘢𝘵𝘪𝘯𝘨 𝘰𝘶𝘳 𝘧𝘪𝘯𝘢𝘯𝘤𝘪𝘢𝘭 𝘢𝘥𝘮𝘪𝘯𝘪𝘴𝘵𝘳𝘢𝘵𝘪𝘰𝘯 𝘰𝘧 𝘊𝘪𝘵𝘺” according to Pearce.
The significance of this run to the case at the IC is in how it combines with email run (x). It also helps go to show that Man City is indeed a de facto state-owned club. The only way UAE Govt. officials would be facilitating financial administration of Man City is if it were state-owned and run; something Man City has categorically denied many times.

🧵14/25
𝗘𝗺𝗮𝗶𝗹 𝗿𝘂𝗻 (𝘃𝗶𝗶𝗶) - 𝟮𝟳 𝗠𝗮𝗿𝗰𝗵 𝟮𝟬𝟭𝟰
This is an email run involving: Andrew Widdowson (Man City’s Head of Finance), and Jorge Chumillas (Man City’s CFO).
None of this email run was used at the CAS hearing.
The run is about Widdowson and Chumillas aligning on what sponsors still need to pay Man City. The most relevant parts occur in: an email from Widdowson at 19:56 where he says “𝘰𝘳𝘪𝘨𝘪𝘯𝘢𝘭 𝘤𝘰𝘯𝘵𝘳𝘢𝘤𝘵 𝘢𝘮𝘰𝘶𝘯𝘵𝘴 𝘪𝘦 𝘵𝘩𝘰𝘴𝘦 𝘵𝘩𝘢𝘵 𝘴𝘩𝘰𝘶𝘭𝘥 𝘤𝘰𝘮𝘦 𝘥𝘪𝘳𝘦𝘤𝘵 𝘧𝘳𝘰𝘮 𝘱𝘢𝘳𝘵𝘯𝘦𝘳𝘴”; an email from Chumillas at 8.38PM where he says “𝘧𝘰𝘳𝘮𝘢𝘭𝘭𝘺, 𝘸𝘦 𝘸𝘢𝘯𝘵 𝘢𝘭𝘭 𝘰𝘧 𝘵𝘩𝘦𝘴𝘦 𝘢𝘮𝘰𝘶𝘯𝘵𝘴 𝘵𝘰 𝘣𝘦 𝘱𝘢𝘪𝘥 𝘣𝘺 𝘈𝘢𝘣𝘢𝘳 𝘢𝘯𝘥 𝘌𝘵𝘪𝘴𝘢𝘭𝘢𝘵”; and in response when Widdowson says “𝘪𝘧 𝘵𝘩𝘦𝘺 𝘤𝘢𝘯”.
What is being discussed is the recognition that there were “𝘰𝘳𝘪𝘨𝘪𝘯𝘢𝘭 𝘤𝘰𝘯𝘵𝘳𝘢𝘤𝘵 𝘢𝘮𝘰𝘶𝘯𝘵𝘴” much lower than what these sponsors are recorded as paying (as can be seen in the attachment of the email on 22 May 2013). This is because the original amounts are the direct payments which must be paid by Aabar and Etisalat and the rest is ADUG contribution.
If these were truly independent, third party sponsorships there would be no question of whether “𝘧𝘰𝘳𝘮𝘢𝘭𝘭𝘺” the payments would come from them or not. That would be the only way - no “𝘧𝘰𝘳𝘮𝘢𝘭𝘭𝘺” about it.
All this adds further evidence to support the case.

🧵15/25
𝗘𝗺𝗮𝗶𝗹 𝗿𝘂𝗻 (i𝘅) - 𝟭𝟴-𝟮𝟯 𝗝𝘂𝗹𝘆 𝟮𝟬𝟭𝟰
This is an email run involving: Andrew Widdowson (Man City’s Head of Finance), Simon Pearce (a Director of Man City’s board, a senior figure in the UAE Govt and a key advisor to both the ruler of the UAE and Man City’s Chairman), Jorge Chumillas (Man City’s CFO), someone at the sponsor Etisalat, Man City’s Head of Regional Partnership Marketing and Director of Partnership Marketing (names redacted by Der Spiegel likely for privacy reasons)
None of this email run was used at the CAS hearing.
The run is about chasing Etisalat for outstanding payment of funds. What surfaces is that no contract was signed for the latest sponsorship funds and now Pearce must do some “𝘣𝘢𝘤𝘬-𝘤𝘩𝘢𝘯𝘯𝘦𝘭𝘪𝘯𝘨” to fix it.
This evidence may help the Premier League in its case at the IC if it can demonstrate with accounting records that revenues were being recorded without a contract in place. However, what is certainly pertinent is it’s more evidence of Pearce’s involvement in liaising between Man City and its sponsors - a key pillar in the case.

🧵16/25
𝗘𝗺𝗮𝗶𝗹 𝗿𝘂𝗻 (𝘅) - 𝟭𝟲 𝗠𝗮𝗿𝗰𝗵 𝟮𝟬𝟭𝟱
This is an email run involving: Simon Pearce (a Director of Man City’s board, a senior figure in the UAE Govt and a key advisor to both the ruler of the UAE and Man City’s Chairman), Andrew Widdowson (Man City’s Head of Finance) and Jorge Chumillas (Man City’s CFO).
None of this email run was used at the CAS hearing.
The run is about Chumillas obtaining contact details for Omar Awad (a member of EAA - the Executive Affairs Authority, a special Govt. agency for the ruler of UAE) so that he can send him the outstanding invoices for Man City’s sponsor, Etisalat.
Now, Etisalat is a state-owned company, however, Omar Awad is a UAE Govt. official within EAA and not part of Etisalat. Pearce has previously described Omar as someone who “𝘪𝘴 𝘷𝘦𝘳𝘺 𝘪𝘮𝘱𝘰𝘳𝘵𝘢𝘯𝘵 𝘢𝘯𝘥 𝘩𝘦𝘭𝘱𝘧𝘶𝘭 𝘪𝘯 𝘧𝘢𝘤𝘪𝘭𝘪𝘵𝘢𝘵𝘪𝘯𝘨 𝘰𝘶𝘳 𝘧𝘪𝘯𝘢𝘯𝘤𝘪𝘢𝘭 𝘢𝘥𝘮𝘪𝘯𝘪𝘴𝘵𝘳𝘢𝘵𝘪𝘰𝘯 𝘰𝘧 𝘊𝘪𝘵𝘺”.
The relevance of this is that it is drawing a connection between a Govt. official who facilitates the financial administration of Man City with someone who facilitates the financial administration of its sponsor. This draws a strong connection for this being a related-party transaction, which Man City asserts is not the case and reported as such in their financial statements. It further builds the case against Man City.

🧵17/25
𝗘𝗺𝗮𝗶𝗹 𝗿𝘂𝗻 𝗮𝗻𝗱 𝗮𝘁𝘁𝗮𝗰𝗵𝗺𝗲𝗻𝘁 (𝘅𝗶) - 𝟵-𝟮𝟯 𝗝𝘂𝗹𝘆 𝟮𝟬𝟭𝟱
This is an email run with a slide deck attachment involving: Jorge Chumillas (Man City’s CFO), Simon Pearce (a Director of Man City’s board, a senior figure in the UAE Govt and a key advisor to both the ruler of the UAE and Man City’s Chairman) and CCing Ferran Soriano (Man City’s CEO).
The email run and its attachment were not used at the CAS hearing.
The initial email sent by Chumillas to Pearce is in response to an email that Pearce had sent Chumillas the day before on 9 July 2015, in which he asks Chumillas to explain some of the “𝘶𝘯𝘦𝘷𝘦𝘯 𝘢𝘮𝘰𝘶𝘯𝘵𝘴 𝘧𝘰𝘳 𝘈𝘋 [𝘈𝘣𝘶 𝘋𝘩𝘢𝘣𝘪] 𝘴𝘱𝘰𝘯𝘴𝘰𝘳𝘴”. Chumillas responds and answers his questions beneath each one. As you can see, in Chumillas’ breakdowns he distinguishes for each sponsor the amount “𝘱𝘢𝘪𝘥 𝘥𝘪𝘳𝘦𝘤𝘵 𝘣𝘺 𝘵𝘩𝘦𝘮”. In the powerpoint slide attached to the email there is a table headed “𝘈𝘋𝘜𝘎 [𝘔𝘢𝘯 𝘊𝘪𝘵𝘺’𝘴 𝘰𝘸𝘯𝘦𝘳] 𝘉𝘶𝘥𝘨𝘦𝘵 15/16 𝘋𝘳𝘢𝘧𝘵 𝘊𝘢𝘴𝘩 𝘍𝘭𝘰𝘸”. The section described as “𝘍𝘶𝘯𝘥𝘪𝘯𝘨 𝘷𝘪𝘢 𝘈𝘣𝘶 𝘋𝘩𝘢𝘣𝘪 𝘗𝘢𝘳𝘵𝘯𝘦𝘳𝘴” shows figures much bigger than the figures “𝘱𝘢𝘪𝘥 𝘥𝘪𝘳𝘦𝘤𝘵 𝘣𝘺” the sponsors. Again, this showcases the arrangement of channelling ADUG equity funds through the sponsors, with the sponsors only paying a limited sum themselves.
In a subsequent email in the run, Chumillas explains that when bonuses (based on performance) are due from the sponsors as part of the sponsorship deal, that “𝘣𝘰𝘯𝘶𝘴 𝘱𝘢𝘺𝘮𝘦𝘯𝘵𝘴 𝘢𝘳𝘦 𝘥𝘶𝘦 𝘪𝘯 𝘑𝘶𝘯𝘦” and “𝘵𝘩𝘢𝘵 𝘩𝘢𝘴 𝘢𝘭𝘸𝘢𝘺𝘴 𝘣𝘦𝘦𝘯 𝘵𝘩𝘦 𝘵𝘳𝘦𝘢𝘵𝘮𝘦𝘯𝘵 𝘰𝘯 𝘣𝘶𝘪𝘭𝘥𝘪𝘯𝘨 𝘈𝘋𝘜𝘎 𝘊𝘢𝘴𝘩 𝘍𝘭𝘰𝘸 𝘉𝘶𝘥𝘨𝘦𝘵”. Here, Chumillas is clarifying that when more fee is triggered in the sponsorship contract, it requires amendments to the owner’s own cash flow budget. If sponsors were paying directly to Man City, this would not be possible. It’s necessary so that ADUG can fund the sponsors new fee. i.e., disguising equity as sponsorship revenue.
The run ends with Pearce acknowledging the arrangements.
None of this adds too much ‘new’ evidence except for the year it applies to. However, it does yet again demonstrate Pearce interacting with the arrangements outlined in the emails - something CAS found not to be probable based on his testimony and the evidence available to them.

🧵18/25
𝗘𝗺𝗮𝗶𝗹 𝗿𝘂𝗻 (𝘅𝗶𝗶) - 𝟮𝟰 𝗔𝘂𝗴𝘂𝘀𝘁 - 𝟭𝟳 𝗦𝗲𝗽𝘁𝗲𝗺𝗯𝗲𝗿 𝟮𝟬𝟭𝟱
This is an email run involving: Martyn Hawkins (Man City’s Financial Controller), Simon Pearce (a Director of Man City’s board, a senior figure in the UAE Govt and a key advisor to both the ruler of the UAE and Man City’s Chairman), Jorge Chumillas (Man City’s CFO), Andrew Widdowson (Man City’s Head of Finance) and sometimes Ferran Soriano (Man City’s CEO).
It also involves Peter Baumgartner (Chief Commercial Officer of Etihad).
This email run relates to Email E analysed in my prior thread, found here: x.com
This run of emails starts with Hawkins sharing some invoices for Etihad, Man City’s major sponsor, with Chumillas. Chumillas forwards on the invoices with commentary to Pearce (Email E). In it, Chumillas specified that in the invoice to Etihad where £67.5million must be paid for the 2015/16 sponsorship deal, only £8million is to come from Etihad whilst £59.5million is to be contributed by the owner, ADUG (as disguised equity).
As I mentioned in my previous analysis, you’d think that if Simon Pearce weren’t facilitating these payments over the past few years that Man City’s CFO would have stopped asking him to do so by this point!
The next part of the run occurs a few weeks later. There is an email from Peter Baumgartner (Chief Commercial Officer of Etihad) confirming the payment from Etihad to City Football Group, which Pearce forwards onto Chumillas and he forwards onto Widdowson.
In the run, Andrew Widdowson (Man City’s Head of Finance) confirms receipt of the payment and clarifies “it is the £8m short ie the amount that Etihad should be funding directly”. Here, he is specific that the £8m (that separately ends up being paid directly from Etihad to Man City) is what they “fund directly”. The differentiation is the other payment is the equity that has been funnelled through Eithad. At CAS, Man City’s witnesses had testified that the separate payments related to monies being paid entirely from Etihad but from different internal budgets. These emails show this not to be the case.
In the last email in the run, Chumillas confirms receipt of the £60.5m and in doing so, also explicitly confirms it relates to the overall 2014/15 sponsorship fee of £67.5m (in the sponsorship contract) less £8m “𝘋𝘪𝘳𝘦𝘤𝘵 𝘌𝘵𝘪𝘩𝘢𝘥 𝘤𝘰𝘯𝘵𝘳𝘪𝘣𝘶𝘵𝘪𝘰𝘯” that always seems to be paid separately.
The relevance of this run is that it again provides corroborating evidence of a whole action taking place. Whereas Email E only sets out the planned arrangements, the run supplies the context to show that it transpired.
Another powerful piece of evidence that would challenge testimony provided at CAS and weaken Man City’s case.

🧵19/25
𝗣𝗮𝗿𝘁 𝟱 - 𝗛𝗼𝘄 𝗱𝗮𝗺𝗮𝗴𝗶𝗻𝗴 𝘄𝗼𝘂𝗹𝗱 𝘁𝗵𝗲 𝘄𝗵𝗼𝗹𝗲 𝗰𝗮𝗰𝗵𝗲 𝗵𝗮𝘃𝗲 𝗯𝗲𝗲𝗻 𝘁𝗼 𝗠𝗮𝗻 𝗖𝗶𝘁𝘆’𝘀 𝗰𝗮𝘀𝗲 𝗵𝗮𝗱 𝗶𝘁 𝗯𝗲𝗲𝗻 𝗰𝗼𝗻𝘀𝗶𝗱𝗲𝗿𝗲𝗱 𝗮𝘁 𝗖𝗔𝗦?
This is impossible to know for certain.
The biggest blow to Uefa’s case was a majority decision of the CAS panel to interpret the required standard of proof as meaning Uefa would need to demonstrate that owner funds were transferred into sponsors’ accounts in order for the charges to hold.
The CAS panel asserted that to achieve this, transaction records would be required - an impossible ask for Uefa given they do not have the power to obtain such information.
However, the cache does hold documents from Man City, its sponsors and the UAE Govt. that assert the arrangements were undertaken.
Also, key to Man City’s case was witness testimony asserting that the arrangements were never followed, which would have been far riskier for the witnesses to assert had the whole cache been available as evidence to impeach.
So in all, it’s really hard to predict which way it would have gone.
My own personal view is the CAS decision was egregious even without the cache and that all of Man City’s charges should have stood with the available evidence alone. I will provide detail on what went wrong at CAS in an upcoming thread later this summer.

🧵20/25
𝗣𝗮𝗿𝘁 𝟲 - 𝗛𝗼𝘄 𝗱𝗮𝗺𝗮𝗴𝗶𝗻𝗴 𝘄𝗶𝗹𝗹 𝘁𝗵𝗲 𝘄𝗵𝗼𝗹𝗲 𝗰𝗮𝗰𝗵𝗲 𝗯𝗲 𝘁𝗼 𝗠𝗮𝗻 𝗖𝗶𝘁𝘆 𝗮𝘁 𝘁𝗵𝗲 𝘂𝗽𝗰𝗼𝗺𝗶𝗻𝗴 𝗜𝗻𝗱𝗲𝗽𝗲𝗻𝗱𝗲𝗻𝘁 𝗖𝗼𝗺𝗺𝗶𝘀𝘀𝗶𝗼𝗻?
Incredibly so.
These aren’t a handful of emails, from a few low-level employees, internally hypothesizing how they might circumvent FFP as a mental exercise. These emails:
Are between many of Man City’s most senior executives and directors, involving a key player in UAE’s government with powerful influence over the sponsors
Are numerous and carry on over years
Involve sponsors themselves
Outline in unambiguous terms and precise detail the arrangements they are undertaking to subvert FFP
Confirm they have enacted the arrangements to subvert FFP in prior quarters and years
Schedule payments that match receipts into Man City’s bank accounts
When it comes to your own documents being leaked… this is as devastating and incriminating as it gets.
And as for the position on required standard of proof that CAS adopted which neutered the evidentiary value of the leaked emails - that absolutely should not happen this time around (I explain why below).
Now, I’m aware that some commentators on this matter have dismissively said that the emails aren’t a ‘smoking gun’.
For me… they’re far more incriminating than a smoking gun.
These emails are more akin to detailed plans on how the offences will be carried out, alongside a confession of having undertaken them. The volume and detail of the evidence is staggering. Anyone who tries to wave them away is either being disingenuous, clueless or corrupted by bias to the point of delusion.
I don’t disagree that some corroborating evidence will be critical but this requirement will be far more limited and easily met than what ended up being demanded by the majority of the CAS panel as proof of guilt.
My analogy of the Premier League’s investigation into Man City is that of a black hole…
For years, Man City desperately tried to escape its massive gravitational pull, fighting a futile 5-year-long battle against the Premier League in the English courts. It lost and the subsequent empanelling of the IC is akin to them passing the event horizon. There’s no escape now. It’s a one-way trip to the crushing force of judgement at the singularity.
Now, I’ll explain why…
𝙒𝙝𝙖𝙩 𝙚𝙫𝙞𝙙𝙚𝙣𝙘𝙚 𝙙𝙞𝙙 𝘾𝘼𝙎 𝙙𝙚𝙢𝙖𝙣𝙙 𝙖𝙨 𝙣𝙚𝙘𝙚𝙨𝙨𝙖𝙧𝙮 𝙩𝙤 𝙪𝙥𝙝𝙤𝙡𝙙 𝙩𝙝𝙚 𝙘𝙝𝙖𝙧𝙜𝙚𝙨?
CAS applies a standard of proof known as ‘comfortable satisfaction’ in its hearings, including the one between Man City and Uefa. The principle applied for this standard is ‘the more serious the charge, the more cogent the evidence must be to ascertain guilt’. As far as I am aware, it is the only court in the world to apply such a standard. It is also highly subjective in the nature of what ‘comfortable’ means.
In its judgment, a majority of the CAS panel specified that its role was to adjudicate on whether Uefa’s charges of fraudulent financial reporting (and subsequent implications to FFP) were proven. They made clear that their role was 𝗻𝗼𝘁 to judge whether Man City disguised equity as sponsorship revenue; a subtle difference but what it meant was CAS insisted that for them to judge whether Man City had fraudulently financially reported, Uefa must first establish that the arrangements described in the emails had definitively taken place. Such a demand was akin to applying a principle known as corpus delicti in English Law - the principle that a crime must be proved to have occurred before a person can be convicted of committing that crime.
As such, the majority of the CAS panel decided that this meant in order for them to determine that the arrangements described in the emails had in fact occurred (i.e., Man City disguised equity as sponsorship revenue by funnelling it through the sponsors’ accounts) that, according to a standard of proof of comfortable satisfaction, they would need to see evidence of money transfers from Man City’s owner to the sponsors in the form of accounting and bank transaction records.
Now, this is the kind of evidence that would typically be required at a criminal proceeding to prove guilt beyond reasonable doubt. In fact, I’m not sure what more powerful, theoretical evidence could even exist. It’s also evidence that Uefa could never possibly obtain given they simply do not have that power. This is why I believe the majority of the CAS panel adopted a position that would prevent Uefa from ever winning the case. They were asking for the moon.
Again, I will explain why I believe it was wrong for CAS to do this in my thread on how Man City were let off the hook at CAS later this summer.
Had the entire cache been available as evidence (which did not just outline how the arrangements would be carried out but also provided evidence of it taking place) then it is unclear how this would have affected the CAS Panel’s decision on this matter. We’ll just never know.
𝙒𝙝𝙮 𝙬𝙤𝙣’𝙩 𝙩𝙝𝙚 𝙄𝘾 𝙙𝙚𝙢𝙖𝙣𝙙 𝙖𝙡𝙡 𝙤𝙛 𝙩𝙝𝙞𝙨 𝙩𝙤𝙤?
Because the IC will follow English law and adopt a different standard of proof. Since the charges are a matter of civil law and not criminal law, the standard of proof required will be on the balance of probabilities and the principle of corpus delicti will certainly not apply either.
This means the IC will have to decide whether it was more or less probable that Man City committed the offences they are accused of. It’s often referred to as the 51% test. If the IC says it’s 51% likely that they did it, then they are liable (equivalent of convicted).
As such, the level of evidence that must be afforded to demonstrate guilt is simply far lower.
𝙎𝙤 𝙬𝙝𝙖𝙩 𝙙𝙤𝙚𝙨 𝙩𝙝𝙞𝙨 𝙢𝙚𝙖𝙣 𝙛𝙤𝙧 𝙩𝙝𝙚 𝙥𝙧𝙤𝙗𝙖𝙗𝙞𝙡𝙞𝙩𝙮 𝙤𝙛 ‘𝙘𝙤𝙣𝙫𝙞𝙘𝙩𝙞𝙤𝙣’ 𝙖𝙩 𝙩𝙝𝙚 𝙄𝘾?
It means it’s high.
Something that no-one has ever done is afford a plausible explanation for why these emails would exist if Man City were not undertaking the arrangements contained within them.
I know individuals with a rather powerful imagination when it comes to financial matters (including financial crime) and we have tried for a long time to think of one. We could not. I have made an open offer on twitter to hear one. None has been provided. One was never afforded at CAS either. Had it been, CAS would have written the judgement very differently.
Without such a plausible explanation, I don’t see how any independent, reasonable person could ever set aside the vast body of email evidence and come to the conclusion that it’s more probable that the arrangements were not undertaken.
Man City’s legal team can show all the accounting evidence it wants to try and refute the allegations - like it did at CAS - but if you accept there’s a possibility that the charges are true (i.e., that Man City conspired with sponsors to commit fraudulent financial reporting) then I do not see how you cannot also allow for the equally likely possibility that any accounting evidence provided has been tampered with. If you’ve been running a conspiracy to fraudulently financially report - why stop now? Holding one as a possibility and not the other is simply incompatible.
As far as I understand the process that can be applied at the IC, witnesses can be made to testify under oath and members of the IC can themselves ask the witnesses questions. I would imagine the same question will arise every time - why did you write these emails again and again if such arrangements were not occurring?
This is why I believe it will be an absolute necessity for Man City to provide a plausible explanation for the emails’ existence that’s also consistent with their position that the arrangements were not undertaken and the reality is, there simply isn’t one.
It’s worth noting that it’s unlikely that the Premier League’s legal team will restrict its evidence to the emails either. It will almost certainly have a large volume of (obtainable) accounting information and maybe even witnesses of its own. From the emails, it is clear that there were many people involved in this operation and some may have been prepared to testify. The Premier League will also have awareness of Man City’s prior legal strategies and witness testimony as a result of CAS, which is helpful for case prep.
All in, I suspect the Premier League’s legal team will have quite the arsenal and that Man City won’t have anything like the cover it did last time around.

🧵21/25
𝗣𝗮𝗿𝘁 𝟳 - 𝗪𝗵𝘆 𝗮𝗿𝗲 𝗠𝗮𝗻 𝗖𝗶𝘁𝘆 𝗲𝘅𝗲𝗰𝘀 𝗮𝗰𝘁𝗶𝗻𝗴 𝘀𝗼 𝗰𝗼𝗻𝗳𝗶𝗱𝗲𝗻𝘁𝗹𝘆?
For me, “acting” is the operative word in that question.
Why would they show anxiety? It does nothing to help them. Only hinder.
If they are actually confident, I would attribute it to unfounded arrogance. As Uefa found out, this is a dangerous thing.
What I would say is this though… if Man City were actually confident of being cleared at the IC and did in fact possess the “irrefutable evidence of their innocence” as they proclaim, then they were monumentally stupid to fight the Premier League in the courts the way they did. They lost and it has resulted in 35 charges for failing to cooperate with the investigation.
These are serious charges that could alone be sufficient to relegate Man City or worse (it is a danger to the league to have a participant that does not respect the league’s authority to investigate its members in order to ensure sporting integrity is maintained - charges such as these are VERY serious).
So if Man City really were that confident they’d be cleared then they have screwed up tremendously.
With these kinds of things, you can never be 100% certain of the outcome - especially when you’re on the outside. Any kind of trial or adjudication can go against you for all sorts of reasons, even when your case is very strong. However, you can assess likelihoods based on what is visible to you. What’s visible to me are the charges the Premier League are pursuing, the Football Leaks emails and how Man City made their case at CAS. With that knowledge, I assess it likely that Man City are absolutely fucked.

🧵22/25
𝗣𝗮𝗿𝘁 𝟴 - 𝗪𝗵𝘆 𝗮𝗿𝗲 𝘆𝗼𝘂 𝘀𝗼 𝗰𝗼𝗻𝗳𝗶𝗱𝗲𝗻𝘁 𝘄𝗵𝗲𝗻 𝗺𝗮𝗻𝘆 𝗼𝘁𝗵𝗲𝗿𝘀 𝗮𝗿𝗲 𝗻𝗼𝘁?
When I have spoken with people or engaged them on twitter about this topic I realised two things:
Most people had never read the evidence let alone understood it.
Most people felt there was no chance of Man City being punished because (a) they had escaped proper punishment at CAS and (b) it’s been years since this came out and nothing has happened to them so far. People felt this meant the Premier League wasn’t taking it seriously.
This is why I chose to start these threads. To make critical information available in a readily accessible way so that people can appreciate the situation for themselves and make their own, informed conclusions.
I’m confident because I understand the evidence, I understand why Man City escaped punishment at CAS and I understand why it’s taken so long to get to this point. I understand how seriously the Premier League has taken this and just how hard they had to fight to get it to where it’s at now.
I’m confident because I understand what differences exist between CAS and the IC. I’m confident because I have trust in the calibre and unimpeachability of those individuals Murray Rosen KC will have selected to sit on the IC.
I’m confident because when I take a step back and see this truly for what it is… probably the largest ever sporting scandal, described in precise detail, all in black and white by those who perpetrated it, available for everyone in the world to see… it becomes clear to me what the outcome will be.
And lastly, because there is no other outcome that bears considering. If this version of Man City is permitted to continue competing then we might as well all pack up our things and go home. It would serve as a blueprint for any state or other powerful actor to subvert the rules with impunity and destroy the integrity of sporting competitions such as the Premier League. What would be the point in watching it anymore?

🧵23/25
𝗣𝗮𝗿𝘁 𝟵 - 𝗪𝗵𝗮𝘁 𝗱𝗼 𝘆𝗼𝘂 𝗯𝗲𝗹𝗶𝗲𝘃𝗲 𝗶𝘀 𝗮 𝘀𝘂𝗶𝘁𝗮𝗯𝗹𝗲 𝘀𝗮𝗻𝗰𝘁𝗶𝗼𝗻?
Given the seriousness of the arrangements outlined in the emails, it demonstrates not only an operation to undertake what must amount to one of the most heinous sporting scandals in the modern era… but also a complete contempt for sporting integrity and a steadfast belief that the rules do not apply to them.
You simply cannot allow such persons to participate in a sporting competition if you want it to be fair and meaningful. As such, there is only one option:
Permanent expulsion until the club is sold to new owners.
I believe as a warning to others, all tainted honours should also be stripped from the club, albeit not from the players and therefore, I personally would not award honours to others clubs retroactively (I’m sure they would find such a thing to be hollow anyway).
I also believe an enormous fine should be applied as a means of compensating clubs who were adversely affected financially by this.
Ironically, had Man City owned up to what they had done following the release of the emails then I actually believe there would have been a way back for the owners. Uefa only applied a 2-season ban from the Champions League. Maybe the Premier League Board would only have opted to relegate them or even just apply a major points deduction. We’ll never know. But, in my opinion, by refusing to submit to the rights and authority of these bodies, duty-bound to ensure the sporting integrity of their competitions, Man City has demonstrated such a dangerous contempt for sporting integrity that it should leave the IC no other choice.

🧵24/25
𝗣𝗮𝗿𝘁 𝟭𝟬 - 𝗜𝘀 𝘁𝗵𝗮𝘁 𝗶𝘁?
The email cache I have analysed so far in this thread (linked in the first post) only pertains to the charges that Uefa pursued Man City for, all connected with the offence of disguising equity as sponsorship income.
Since then, Der Spiegel has written a new article, with further email leaks that reveal:
A Man City manager, Roberto Mancini, was paid “off the books”. i.e., to avoid recording all of the expense that Mancini cost them in their accounts and reporting this for FFP, Man City paid him from other sources instead, thereby committing more fraudulent financial reporting in Man City’s accounts and consequently breaching FFP.
Agents and youth players were paid off the books too, thereby committing fraudulent financial reporting and consequently breaching FFP.
Man City, its owner (ADUG) and a Govt. Department of Abu Dhabi (EEA) were all inter-connected with money flows and personnel. This is in direct contradiction to what Man City assert is the reality and contradicts testimony given under oath at CAS too.
These emails likely served as the catalyst for a number of the charges filed by the Premier League against Man City, which covers ground that Uefa and CAS did not.
Once I have fully dissected these, I will post a new thread with the analysis.
I have not closed the thread though, which is capped at 25 posts. I may also add one more post to this thread in response to comments and questions.
Please note, if you ask questions or assert challenge in a way that makes it clear you have not bothered to properly read and comprehend the thread in an open minded way, I won’t be responding. From past experiences, I have realised all that does is waste my time explaining the same things over and over again to people who can’t or won’t acknowledge it.
If you have a cogent challenge or question that makes clear you have properly absorbed the thread then I will endeavour to respond in good faith. I truly value this.
As previously mentioned, I will be creating another thread on ‘How Man City was let off at CAS’ where I build on the aspects raised here but instead, apply a specific focus not just on the emails, but on the outcome at CAS as a whole. I hope to publish this later in the summer.