Good and Evil: between Ahl Al-sunnah and Ahl Al-kalam.๐งต
The Mu'tazilites and the Ash'arites disputed over the issue of the rational determination of good and evil. The Mu'tazilites asserted that good and evil can be determined by reason, and they held that Allah could
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The Mu'tazilites and the Ash'arites disputed over the issue of the rational determination of good and evil. The Mu'tazilites asserted that good and evil can be determined by reason, and they held that Allah could
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punish people before the arrival of divine law. This stance contradicted the words of Allah, the Exalted: "And We would never punish until We sent a messenger" [Al-Isra 15]. The Asharites, on the other hand, denied that things could be inherently good or evil according to reason.
They claimed that actions, before the arrival of divine law, are neutral in terms of goodness and evil, and their moral value is known solely through divine law. They even allowed for the possibility that Allah could command shirk (associating partners with Him), injustice,
adultery, and immoral acts, stating that these are only forbidden because divine law prohibits them. According to them, reason alone does not indicate their immorality. This stance contradicted Allah's words: "Say, 'Indeed, Allah does not order immorality'" [Al-A'raf: 28],
and His statement: "And He makes lawful for them the good things and prohibits for them the evil" [Al-A'raf: 157]. The Ash'arites also discussed the permissibility of Allah commanding His servants to do what they cannot bear. However, Allah guided Ahl al-Sunnah to the truth
in this matter by His permission. They affirmed that actions have intrinsic goodness and evilness that can be perceived by reason as well as by divine law. They held that accountability and punishment occur only after the arrival of divine law, so reward and punishment are based
solely on commands and prohibitions. Therefore, inherently evil actions such as shirk, injustice, and adultery are evil in themselves, and it is impossible for Allah to command them. However, before the arrival of divine law, such actions do not warrant punishment; Allah does not
punish people for committing evils except after sending messengers.
Ash'ari quotes on the matter:
Al-Juwayni said: "Reason does not indicate the goodness or evilness of anything in the context of divine obligation. Rather, the understanding of what is good and evil is derived
Ash'ari quotes on the matter:
Al-Juwayni said: "Reason does not indicate the goodness or evilness of anything in the context of divine obligation. Rather, the understanding of what is good and evil is derived
from the sources of divine law and the imperatives of revelation."
(Al-Irshad ila Qawati' al-Adilla, p. 278)
Al-Shahrastani said: "The doctrine of the people of truth is that reason does not indicate the goodness or evilness of a thing in the context of divine obligation,
(Al-Irshad ila Qawati' al-Adilla, p. 278)
Al-Shahrastani said: "The doctrine of the people of truth is that reason does not indicate the goodness or evilness of a thing in the context of divine obligation,
meaning that the actions of servants do not have intrinsic qualities of goodness or evilness."
(Nihayat al-Iqdam fi 'Ilm al-Kalam, p. 208)
Al-Iji said: "Imposing what cannot be borne is permissible according to us, as we have previously stated that nothing is obligatory upon
(Nihayat al-Iqdam fi 'Ilm al-Kalam, p. 208)
Al-Iji said: "Imposing what cannot be borne is permissible according to us, as we have previously stated that nothing is obligatory upon
Him (Allah), nor is anything considered evil from Him."
(Al-Mawaqif, 3/290)
Response:
Ibn Taymiyyah said: "Rational people agree that certain actions are agreeable to humans while others are not. When it is said that something is good or bad, this goodness and badness are
(Al-Mawaqif, 3/290)
Response:
Ibn Taymiyyah said: "Rational people agree that certain actions are agreeable to humans while others are not. When it is said that something is good or bad, this goodness and badness are
known by reason, according to the consensus of rational people. However, they disputed whether goodness and badness, in the sense of an action being a cause for blame and punishment, can be known by reason or only through divine law. One of the reasons for this dispute is that
they thought this second type was different from the first, whereas it is not separate from it. There is no goodness except in the sense of something being agreeable, and no badness except in the sense of something being disagreeable. Praise and reward are agreeable, while blame
and punishment are disagreeable. This is a type of agreeableness and disagreeableness. The discussion remains on certain types of goodness and badness, not all of them. There is no doubt that some types can only be known through divine law. However, the dispute concerns [whether]
the badness of actions known to the general public, such as injustice and lying, [can be known by reason alone.]
The dispute involves several points: one of them is whether an action has a characteristic that makes it inherently good or bad, and that rational goodness is
The dispute involves several points: one of them is whether an action has a characteristic that makes it inherently good or bad, and that rational goodness is
its alignment with the interests of the world, while rational badness is the opposite. Does divine law add anything beyond this? Another point is whether punishment in this world and the hereafter can be known by reason alone? Some people added a third category to goodness and
badness and claimed consensus on it: whether an action is a quality of perfection or deficiency. This category was not mentioned by the early theologians discussing this issue, but it was mentioned by some later scholars like Al-Razi, who took it from the philosophers.
The truth is that this category does not differ from the first; the perfection that a person achieves through certain actions ultimately relates to agreeableness and disagreeableness, which are pleasure and pain. The soul takes pleasure in what is a perfection for it and suffers
from deficiency. Therefore, perfection and deficiency return to the agreeable and disagreeable.
The point here is that the difference between good actions, which bring pleasure to their doer, and bad actions, which bring pain, is a sensory matter known to all living beings."
The point here is that the difference between good actions, which bring pleasure to their doer, and bad actions, which bring pain, is a sensory matter known to all living beings."
(Majmu' al-Fatawa, 8/309)
Ibn Taymiyyah also said: "The correct view is that the judgments on actions are not intrinsic attributes but rather contingent upon the actions according to their harmony or discord. Goodness and badness, in the sense of something being beloved or hated
Ibn Taymiyyah also said: "The correct view is that the judgments on actions are not intrinsic attributes but rather contingent upon the actions according to their harmony or discord. Goodness and badness, in the sense of something being beloved or hated
, beneficial or harmful, agreeable or disagreeable, are affirmative attributes of the subject, but they vary according to its conditions, so they are not intrinsic to it. And whoever claims that actions do not have attributes that necessitate goodness and badness is like someone
saying that substances do not have attributes that necessitate heating, cooling, satiation, or quenching. Denying the attributes of entities that necessitate effects is like denying the attributes of actions that necessitate effects."
(Minhaj as-Sunnah 3/178)
(Minhaj as-Sunnah 3/178)
He also said: "Muslims and people of all religions agree that Allah is just, equitable, and does not commit injustice; He is free from any injustice. When they delved into the topic of predestination, they disputed the meaning of Him being just and the injustice He is free from.
Some said: Injustice is not possible, for anything that is possible, if it were to be done by Him, is justice, while Injustice is what is impossible, like the combination of opposites or the existence of something nonexistent, for injustice could mean acting in the domain of
someone else's property, and everything belongs to Him, or disobeying an authority whose obedience is obligatory, and there is no authority above Allah whose obedience is obligatory. These people say: Whatever can be imagined to exist, if it is decreed by Him, is justice, so,
when they say: Every blessing from Him is a favor, and every punishment from Him is just; that is the notion folded [underneath this expression.] And this is the view of the determinists [Jabriyyah], like Jahm and his followers, as well as Al-ash'ari and similar theologians,
and those who agree with them from the jurists, hadith scholars, and Sufis.
The second view is that He is just and does not commit injustice because nothing of the sins exists by his will, neither disbelief, nor immorality, nor disobedience; the servants did these acts without
The second view is that He is just and does not commit injustice because nothing of the sins exists by his will, neither disbelief, nor immorality, nor disobedience; the servants did these acts without
His will, as they acted against His command. He did not create any of the servants' actions, neither good nor bad; rather, they initiated their actions. When they committed sins, they deserved punishment for them, and He punished them for their actions without injustice.
This is the view of the Qadariyyah from the Mu'tazilites and others. They believe that He cannot be absolved of injustice unless He is not considered the creator of any of the servants' actions, nor capable of doing so, and unless He is not seen as willing all existing things.
Rather he wills what does not happen and certain can happen without his will, because for them; will is synonymous with command, and these with the group mentioned before both have significant contradictions. Each group has writings and arguments against the other,
and each group calls the other Qadariyyah...
The third view is that injustice is putting something in the wrong place, and justice is putting everything in its proper place. He, exalted be He, is wise and just, placing things in their appropriate places and does not place
The third view is that injustice is putting something in the wrong place, and justice is putting everything in its proper place. He, exalted be He, is wise and just, placing things in their appropriate places and does not place
anything except where it belongs; where wisdom and justice necessitate. He does not differentiate between similar things nor equate different things and He only punishes those who deserve punishment, placing it in its proper context due to wisdom and justice.
As for the people of righteousness and piety, He does not punish them at all. Allah says: "Shall We treat the Muslims like the criminals? What is the matter with you? How do you judge?" [Al-Qalam: 35-36]."
(Jami' al-Rasa'il, 1/121-124)
(Jami' al-Rasa'il, 1/121-124)
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