My big issue with this - & the comments etc - is the idea that amphib capability is exclusively *naval*.
It isn't. By definition, it is inter-domain. Saying amphib is about naval forces - or at most maritime - misses the point: UK needs amphib capabilities for LAND expeditionary
It isn't. By definition, it is inter-domain. Saying amphib is about naval forces - or at most maritime - misses the point: UK needs amphib capabilities for LAND expeditionary
In the late 1940s, the Staffs of Combined Forces HQ warned against thinking of amphib ops the way the RN/RM thought pre 1914 & in the interior years: as exclusive naval "strike forces" (they used those exact terms). They argued that amphib is the shaping op for a Land campaign.
Raid all you want, they said, but the reason you had oodles of specialist eqpt post war, & why the RM moved into a specialist amphib role post war (1950s) was the need to export Land forces.
You don't need LPDs for light raids. You do need them for putting heavy eqpt ashore.
You don't need LPDs for light raids. You do need them for putting heavy eqpt ashore.
Now, up until the 70s, the Army had the Landing Ship Tanks, Logistics etc. Very sensibly, as they existed for Army purposes. Cuts, pre-positioning & BAOR did away with the platforms - or transferred to RFA. They did retain niche capabilities, though, like 17RCT (now @17_RLC)
@17_RLC So amphib became a (near) solely naval endeavour; even the bit done by "land" was a maritime force component (3Cdo Bde).
Which is ludicrous when you consider we are an island nation that has to export its Army to get to the front.
But it gets sillier.
Which is ludicrous when you consider we are an island nation that has to export its Army to get to the front.
But it gets sillier.
@17_RLC How, you ask?
Well, the Cdos - since the 1980s - have argued "red carpet" port-to-port transfer of stores, materiel etc don't count as amphib ops.
Which would mean 90% of amphibiously enabled ops throughout history don't count... because RM say it doesn't.
Well, the Cdos - since the 1980s - have argued "red carpet" port-to-port transfer of stores, materiel etc don't count as amphib ops.
Which would mean 90% of amphibiously enabled ops throughout history don't count... because RM say it doesn't.
@17_RLC & the RN - being dark Blue minded - take the RM version of events as gospel. Well, that's reasonable if they're the experts, right?
But *all* amphib doctrine - including the Cdo Force conops - talks about the purpose of the tactical assault/landing about setting the condition...
But *all* amphib doctrine - including the Cdo Force conops - talks about the purpose of the tactical assault/landing about setting the condition...
@17_RLC ...for *Follow-On Forces*.
Which, by definition, *are not Cdos*.
So amphib is joint *only* at the point when the follow-on *Land* forces touch shore.
Ah, but assault is dead, goes the cry. A2AD, proliferation of UAVs etc have made the opposed landing moot.
News flash...
Which, by definition, *are not Cdos*.
So amphib is joint *only* at the point when the follow-on *Land* forces touch shore.
Ah, but assault is dead, goes the cry. A2AD, proliferation of UAVs etc have made the opposed landing moot.
News flash...
@17_RLC The same was said in *1757*; *1905*; *1916*; & in the interwar period; for many of the same reasons (defensive fires etc).
Here's the thing: the only times we make opposed landings is when we have no choice, & we have local superiority of fires, materiel & troops.
Here's the thing: the only times we make opposed landings is when we have no choice, & we have local superiority of fires, materiel & troops.
@17_RLC But I digress...back to amphib shipping.
Reinforcing the Baltics etc means sending army vehicles on RoRos into potentially contested waters, hopefully to a port that is undamaged.
Corbett recognised that as an amphib op. We don't, for some unfathomable flip in logic.
Reinforcing the Baltics etc means sending army vehicles on RoRos into potentially contested waters, hopefully to a port that is undamaged.
Corbett recognised that as an amphib op. We don't, for some unfathomable flip in logic.
@17_RLC Which is where all this gets silly because the RoRos aren't built for tactically hostile environments.
Yet we've seen just how contested littoral waters can be - & how vulnerable unprotected ships are. Which shouldn't be new, considering Atlantic Conveyor.
Yet we've seen just how contested littoral waters can be - & how vulnerable unprotected ships are. Which shouldn't be new, considering Atlantic Conveyor.
@17_RLC All of this is to say...
If we think of amphib as a purely *naval* evolution, we are failing to see the broader picture. Our doctrine explicitly recognises amphib as a Tactical evolution - with hints to the operational. That is limiting our vision.
If we think of amphib as a purely *naval* evolution, we are failing to see the broader picture. Our doctrine explicitly recognises amphib as a Tactical evolution - with hints to the operational. That is limiting our vision.
@17_RLC The result is that the main requirers of amphib shipping - the Follow On Forces - are not the ones setting the requirement.
How credible is sending lightly armed (if at all) cargo vessels, into the Baltic? We all know the lessons of Atlantoc Conveyor; we now need to learn it.
How credible is sending lightly armed (if at all) cargo vessels, into the Baltic? We all know the lessons of Atlantoc Conveyor; we now need to learn it.
Loading suggestions...